There has been considerable research, by numerous historians in Australia, Britain and in Germany and many of those that in some way have engaged themselves into one of Australia's most remarkable mysteries. What made this task even harder is due to the fact that not one of HMAS SYDNEY'S compliment of 645 officers and men survived to tell their side of the action that claimed the life of one of Australia's most respected light cruisers on November 19th 1941. It is possible that the true facts will never be revealed or known.

The Australian government also through the Royal Australian Navy's official historian George Herman Gill who had been commissioned to produce all wartime historical documents was also commissioned to produce such documentation on the disappearance of HMAS SYDNEY, but it has now been revealed that although given such a task, he was severely restricted by the limits as to what he could mention and to what he could publish.

The question arises, why. Why would one be asked to produce an historical account of what happened when at the same time he would be told, that certain information relating to the disappearance of this Australian light cruiser is classified as restricted and must not be published. Even today, sixty years after the event, these documents and records have still been made unavailable, not even to historians or the next of kin of the personnel of HMAS SYDNEY who over the years have wanted to know the real story as to why HMAS SYDNEY was lost and never found.

The documents are housed in the National Archives in Canberra and while most of them are available to historians, certain documents have been withheld from public access including historians. These include document A264 of the Commonwealth Record Series (CRS) which has been made exempt¹ from public access because it is claimed that they contain personal information on personnel of HMAS SYDNEY. Likewise, a number of documents and records namely MP551/1, B5553, B5554 and B5555 that were produced by the Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne (FRUMEL) have also restricted access. If any valuable information could be gained it would possibly come from those of the Navy Office. These documents were MP1074/1 and MP1074/4 as these contained messages from inward signal packs between November 11th and 20th.

For the purpose of this documentation, HMAS SYDNEY has been highlighted in uppercase white text, the German raider HSK KORMORAN in uppercase green text while all Dates have been highlighted in red text. All other ships both allied and enemy are in italic text.
All references are shown in pale yellow text with the author shown in light brown, or the source in light blue.

HMAS SYDNEY was the second ship of that name to serve with the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), the first saw an impeccable service during WWI, this second ship, a modified Leander class light cruiser and originally named the HMS Phaeton, was built for the British Royal Navy at Wallsend-on-Tyne, England, and was given the name change to HMAS SYDNEY on September 22nd 1934. In 1939, the waters around the continent of Australia were quiet while most of the early action of WWII was taking place in the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean. The following minute was made by the Dominions Office in London:

.........so long as Japan remains neutral it is to be considered that Australian waters may be regarded as unlikely to suffer submarine attack. The most likely danger to be guarded against on the Australian Station under present conditions is that attack on shipping by enemy raiders. It is considered that two cruisers and HMAS Australia should prove adequate for this purpose.
Frederick Shedden, Secretary of the Department of Defence.

HMAS PERTH was already under the control of the Admiralty and that four destroyers were already on loan from the Royal Navy. HMAS SYDNEY, a 6-inch cruiser was chosen for this task on October 6th 1939. Early duties of HMAS SYDNEY was escort and patrol. Then on November 19th 1939, HMAS SYDNEY, in company with HMAS AUSTRALIA and HMAS CANBERRA, both 8-inch cruisers were ordered to patrol the Indian Ocean shipping lanes after the tanker AFRICA SHELL was sunk by the German pocket battleship GRAF SPEE. The search commenced on November 28th and continued for the next four days, but it was fruitless as the GRAF SPEE had returned back into the waters of the Atlantic Ocean. On December 13th 1939, HMAS SYDNEY was relieved by HMAS ADELAIDE and she returned back to the naval dockyard at Cockatoo Island in Sydney. It was on January 27th 1940 that after a short refit, HMAS SYDNEY was to be part of the Anzac convoy US-1 and by February 8th, along with HMAS CANBERRA and HMAS RAMILLIES continued patrol duties of the shipping routes in the east Indian Ocean which also involved much intensive training. On May 5th 1940 HMAS SYDNEY was ordered to Colombo in Ceylon where she arrived on May 8th. From here she continued on to the Mediterranean and joined the 7th Cruiser Squadron under the command of Vice Admiral Sir John Tovey at Alexandria on May 28th 1940.

On June 10th 1940, the Allies found themselves officially at war with Italy. HMAS SYDNEY was in Alexandria Harbour with the Australian 10th Destroyer Squadron known by the Germans as the "Scrap Iron Flotilla". This was a name given to the squadron by Goebbels when he learned that they were aged ships that had been made of scrap iron in Australia. A division of the 7th Cruiser Squadron patrolled Benghazi and the Ionian Islands of which the SYDNEY was part of this. After returning to Alexandria for refuelling, HMAS SYDNEY, along with the British cruisers HMS ORION and HMS NEPTUNE and the French battleship LORRAINE the port of Bardia was bombarded on June 20th. With the news that a French surrender was imminent the squadron was ordered back to the safety of Alexandria. As the French were surrendering to Germany, HMAS SYDNEY was given duties of patrolling the Malta sea lanes and on June 28th after a flying boat spotted three Italian destroyers, a battle of long range proportions began.

The Italian destroyer ESPERO was sunk by the SYDNEY. After this, the Italians made many air attacks on the 7th Cruiser Squadron, but no serious damage was done. Later, on July 19th, the HMAS SYDNEY was involved with a fierce battle with Italian cruisers and destroyers. The SYDNEY damaged one, the BANDE NERE, and suffered a hit on one of her funnels. One Italian cruiser was sunk, this was the BARTOLOMEO COLLEONI, caused by damage sustained from the guns of the SYDNEY which turned the Italian ship into a blazing inferno. The Italian cruiser was finally sunk by two torpedoes from supporting British destroyers, but details of the action still remain sketchy.

The Mediterranean was a successful time for HMAS SYDNEY, from the Admiralty came this message:

HMAS SYDNEY achieved a victory over a superior force which has had important strategical effects ......Sydney's gunnery narrative is of great interest both technically and from the more general point of view. It shows the results obtainable by an efficient control team backed by good material, and it should be given the weight due to the experience of a ship which has had the unique opportunity of firing 2,200 main armament rounds in six weeks.
Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet.

The SYDNEY continued operations in the Mediterranean with the sinking of the Italian tanker ERMIONI (July 28th 1940), received camouflaged paint (August 12th 1940), assisted in the destruction of the Makri Yalo airstrip on the island of Scarpanto (August 30th 1940), successfully defended the Malta convoys throughout her stay and again received commendations from the British Admiralty. HMAS SYDNEY arrived back in Fremantle, Western Australia on February 5th 1941 and finally in the City of Sydney on February 9th in which the ship and its compliment of officers and men received a tremendous welcome.

In the months to follow, HMAS SYDNEY was back on patrols off the West Australian coast, then after escorting the converted transport ship QUEEN MARY back to Jervis Bay on the east coast, the SYDNEY went to Singapore, then back to Fremantle where she arrived at the end of April 1941.

On May 15th 1941, the SYDNEY'S commander Captain John Collins surrendered his command to Captain Joseph Burnett RAN and for the next few months the Australian cruiser was to undertake escort duties again off the West Australian coast, then to Auckland when she later returned to Jervis Bay to escort the ships QUEEN MARY and QUEEN ELIZABETH back to Fremantle with HMAS CANBERRA where she stayed until the end of September 1941.

At the end of October 1941, the troopship SS ZEALANDIA of 6,700 tons was to transport 1,000 men of the Australian 8th Division and the Royal Australian Air Force from Sydney to Singapore via Fremantle. HMAS ADELAIDE was to act as escort from Port Jackson, and escort the ZEALANDIA as far as King George Sound south of Albany. Here, HMAS SYDNEY was to take over the escort duties from HMAS ADELAIDE, and this was undertaken on November 5th 1941. HMAS SYDNEY and the ZEALANDIA arrived at Fremantle W.A. at 0650hrs on November 9th. At 1340hrs on November 11th HMAS SYDNEY, and the ZEALANDIA left Fremantle bound for the Sunda Strait delayed by industrial problems aboard the ZEALANDIA.

HMAS Sydney sailed Fremantle 1340H [ie 1.40 pm local time], escorting Zealandia to Sunda Strait. Zealandia, owing to crew trouble, the cause of which is at present unknown, has delayed her departure from Fremantle. Six firemen left the ship yesterday and three only have been obtained to replace them, but it is anticipated that the numbers will be completed and she will depart today escorted by HMAS Sydney.
Navy Office War Diary, 1939–1943 - Naval Historical Section, Department of Defence, Canberra: B6230

This was three days after HMAS CANBERRA had left Fremantle escorting the QUEEN MARY and QUEEN ELIZABETH to the Cocos Islands where they would be joined by the British ship HMS CORNWALL.

On November 17th, HMAS SYDNEY had safely delivered the SS ZEALANDIA off the coast of Sumatra and handed over the escort duties to HMS DURBAN, this was the same time that the CANBERRA had returned to Fremantle, soon she would be on her way back to Port Jackson. The SYDNEY was then to make her way back to the West Australian port of Fremantle, and was due to arrive during either the late afternoon or early evening on November 20th 1941. In this area, especially close to and down the coastline of Western Australia could be found many shipping lanes that would be used by merchant ships. HMAS SYDNEY was at liberty to stop any of these ships and ask for identification². When the SYDNEY failed to arrive at Fremantle at the due time, the Naval Board was not immediately concerned, claiming that it was possible that any number of merchant ships may have been sighted and that the SYDNEY would be obliged to investigate. At 1556hrs on November 19th 1941, HMAS SYDNEY sighted a merchantman about 150 miles south-west of Carnarvon off the West Australian coast.................

The return trip after leaving the ZEALANDIA in the Sundra Strait was uneventful, the expected arrival of HMAS SYDNEY was to be at a pm time on November 20th. ZEALANDIA was the last to have had signal and visual communication with HMAS SYDNEY and because of radio silence no other communication was made. With Japan close to entering the war it is possible that submarines of the Imperial Japanese Navy could have been in the area, and although the authorities have stated that this would be unlikely, I think that this statement could be disputed.

By her designated arrival time, HMAS SYDNEY had still not contacted or arrived at Fremantle. Records indicate that the last wireless transmissions made by HMAS SYDNEY was from Fremantle on November 11th to advise the Commander in Chief, China Station that owing to a delay, HMAS SYDNEY could not rendezvous with HMS DURBAN until November 17th. Just a few minutes later a signal was sent to Naval Board, Flag Officer Commanding the Australian Squadron (FOCAS) and the District Naval Officer (DNO), Western Australia, asking them to amend the arrival time that she was due back at Fremantle to November 20th. At 1332hrs, HMAS SYDNEY sent a routine wireless message to FOCAS advising of her departure within eight minutes. No further wireless or radio messages were transmitted due to the commitment of radio silence.

But as it is now confirmed that HMAS SYDNEY was off the West Australian coast off Carnarvon on November 19th, it can only be assumed that the Australian cruiser made no contact with any other ship on the return trip. That was, until at 1556hrs in the 19th, when the masthead lookout sighted a merchant ship bearing 192deg at a distance of approximately 12 miles. The estimated position of HMAS SYDNEY at this time was 26deg. 19min. S.: 111deg.06min. E. The SYDNEY was alerted to 'action stations' and proceeded to intercept the merchant. At the same time the merchant turned into the sun and headed westwards HMAS SYDNEY. At 1700hrs, the wireless station at Geraldton received a feint and weak signal but it could in no way be understood, it is thought that this was a QQQ signal sent by the merchant vessel but Geraldton reported that it in no way indicated that it was any form of distress signal. Geraldton requested that all ships report if possible, but there was no reply to this request. By 1715hrs the two ships were just 2,000 yards apart and both ships were now on a WSW course.

HMAS SYDNEY requested by signal light that the merchant ship raise her signal letters, to this the merchant raised the Dutch flag and the identification flags 'PKQI" this was the identification of the Dutch merchantman STRAAT MALAKKA. The Australian cruiser was at 'action stations' with all guns and her torpedoes pointing in the direction of the merchantman, HMAS SYDNEY at this stage did not know that the merchant vessel was in fact the German raider HSK KORMORAN that was originally built as a passenger ship of 9,800 tons and sailed under the name of STEIERMARK and was destined for service on the Hamburg-Amerika line. At the outbreak of war, STEIERMARK was allocated the East Asia service, although at this time she had not entered merchant service. With WWII gaining momentum, the STEIERMARK was converted to an auxiliary cruiser, and become one of Germany's surface raiders.

There were many surface raiders in Germany's naval fleet. These were ships that were converted to heavily armed cruisers and battleships that could camouflage themselves to look like merchant ships. Among these were GRAF SPEE, ATLANTIS, THOR, WIDDER, KOMET and PINGUIN. The STEIERMARK, later renamed HSK KORMORAN by it captain Commander Theodor Detmers, was equipped with over 5,000 tons of fuel, and as most of these surface raiders cruised sedately at about 11 knots it would mean that the ship was able to stay at sea for at least 12 months. Its armament was six 5.9 inch guns, which were so placed so that it gave the ship a 160 degree firing arc. There was also five 2 centimetre anti-aircraft guns and two ex-army 3.7 centimetre anti-aircraft guns mounted behind sheet metal screens and below the bridge. The other armament was six torpedo tubes of which four were fitted on the upper deck while two were submerged below the waterline.

Even though Australia was far from the main source of the war, remember, at this time the centre stage was the European theatre and the sea battles were mainly in the north and south Atlantic Oceans, but the Australian government and the Royal Australian Navy recognised the fact that the waters around the Australian coastline would have to be protected from enemy raiders. For most of 1940, and early 1941, only three Australian warships and one British warship were available to provide Australia with this protection. Casualties on the high seas started on June 18 1940. SS NIAGARA (sunk by German mine in Tasman Sea), TROPIC SEA (sunk in Tasman Sea), SS NOTOU (sunk in Tasman Sea) while a report from SS TURAKINA stated that she had sighted a German surface raider off the eastern Australian coast, resulted in herself being sunk after a gun battle with the ship that she had originally reported sighting. The SS RINGWOOD sunk by the German raider KOMET known as Ship 45 (off Nauru). It was suspected that both these surface raiders operating in Australia and New Zealand waters were operating with the German supply ship KULMERLAND. With the onset of 1941 a number of surface raiders had operated throughout the Indian Ocean, some coming close to the Australian mainland. Among them were: ATLANTIS, PINGUIN, ORION, KORMORAN and SCHEER with a number of supply ships.

The use of surface raiders resulted from Hitler's War Directive No.5 which was:

"Merchant ships and troopships established as definitely being hostile maybe attacked without warning. This also applies to ships sailing without lights in waters around England. Merchantmen which use their radio transmitters on being stopped will also be fired upon......"

The German naval authority also allowed raiders to disguise themselves with foreign flags, but the German Ensign had to be hoisted when engaging in acts of war. This now, was what Captain Burnett was faced with. HMAS SYDNEY requested the merchantman indicate where she was bound by signal flags, to which the STRAAT MALAKKA answered 'Batavia'. HMAS SYDNEY then raised two flags with the letters "IK" and waited for the STRAAT MALAKKA to answer with the other two letters. Detmers instead ordered that the Dutch flag be lowered and the German Ensign be hoisted and camouflage screens be raised exposing her armament. The STRAAT MALAKKA had now become the HSK KORMORAN and was prepared for battle with HMAS SYDNEY. By 1730hrs, the German raider was prepared to fire her first salvo.

The KORMORAN fired the first salvo which fell short of the SYDNEY at 1,400 yards, a second salvo is said to have fell beyond the Australian cruiser, and the official historian estimates that the SYDNEY must then have been 1,500 yards from the KORMORAN. HMAS SYDNEY returned fire and her shells went over the raider without damage, then an immediate reply by the KORMORAN hit the SYDNEY on the bridge and the gun director which both were put out of action. After 20 seconds, both ships were engaged in heavy fire with the KORMORAN receiving a direct hit amidships in which the funnel collapsed and the engine room was extensively damaged. HSK KORMORAN then delivered two torpedoes. One failed to find its target, but the other hit the HMAS SYDNEY between A and B turrets. SYDNEY was on fire amidships and belching thick smoke and turned heading due south with the KORMORAN still firing. At 1745hrs, HMAS SYDNEY fired four of her torpedoes but all of them missed their target.

By 1825hrs, HMAS SYDNEY was listing and still giving off heavy smoke as it sailed away from the battle and this was the time that the KORMORAN that had been severely damaged and was now burning fiercely. The Australian cruiser is alleged to have sailed away in a WSW direction, this giving thoughts that the rudder or steering controls were out of action. That was the last that was ever seen of the Australian cruiser. But did HMAS SYDNEY make an attempt at sending a distress signal:

It is unclear why those preparing the intelligence summary should have thought that the Sydney, a warship, may have sent a Q message. The message referred to was possibly the Q message sent twice by the Kormoran just before the battle commenced, supposedly to confuse the Sydney, although a variety of interpretations have been placed on Detmers’ actions in sending the signals. These messages are recorded as having been picked up by the tug Uco and by radio Geraldton. The archival evidence for Sydney having been the source of the distress signal mentioned in the Weekly Summary is thus inconclusive.
National Archives of Australia

Then there was a report from South West Area Combined Headquarters (SWACH) received by Squadron Leader Cooper at Geraldton and also in Perth W.A. and in Darwin N.T. and sent as a plain language telegraph as "Sydney calling Darwin" and was sent on the PMG (Postmaster General) circuit. This message would possibly not be in relation to a message sent by HMAS SYDNEY in a plain voice transmission on an unsecured PMG line. [ Copy of this message ]. Research records from the National Archives also show another possibility:

Of the records described in this Guide only one suggests, inconclusively, that the Sydney may have sent such a message. Central War Room Weekly Summary No. WS/29 for the week ended 1 December 1941, produced by the Combined Operational Intelligence Centre, includes a five page appendix titled A Report on the action between HMAS Sydney and Raider Kormoran – 19 November 1941, and estimated movements of Raider. Page 1 of the appendix states

‘Subsequent intelligence suggests that HMAS Sydney sent out a weak and corrupt “Q” distress message under extreme difficulties on 19/11. This is being investigated.’

NAA: B6121, 775W/1 – Combined Operational Intelligence Centre – Weekly Summaries of Operational Intelligence, 1941.

But the most likely theory here, was that an explosion in the magazine blew the SYDNEY apart after she had left the engagement with HSK KORMORAN. History shows that there is not much left of a ship when the magazine blows up, HMS HOOD proved that. No mayday call indicates that HMAS SYDNEY must have had her communications destroyed or the generators inoperative, although there is a possibility that garbled radio messages had been received on the West Australian mainland at about the time when HMAS SYDNEY was in naval combat as described above. All that we have to go on is theories, assumptions, statements from the German Prisoners.

Meanwhile, the KORMORAN had sustained enough damage for she was ablaze and the order went out for the crew to 'abandon ship'. The sea off the West Australian coast was littered with small lifeboats and carley floats each of them containing the German officers and men of the KORMORAN. Over 300 Germans were saved, many of then eventually being washed up on the shores of Western Australia, while most were picked up by allied ships and later handed over to the Australian authorities. Details of the action were heard, and these in some cases proved to be untruthful, some exaggerated and some contradicted the statements made by their fellow shipmates. But much of the history, and the truth about the disappearance of HMAS SYDNEY was based on their accounts.

The action off the West Australian coast made news in a number of newspapers around the world, and conjured up descriptions of the HMAS SYDNEY - KORMORAN action based more on fantasy rather than facts. One of these was:

....but it was a torpedo that sank the cruiser Sydney. In one of the strangest actions of the sea, it was fired at the first moment of the Australian warship's triumph. By gunfire she had shattered a powerful armed raider, and she was closing the range to sink her and pick up survivors when she was hit, and both victor and vanquished went to the bottom. Whether the torpedo was fired by the Nazi vessel or by an attendant submarine is uncertain.
Bernard Hall - Daily Express, London, December 4th 1941.

A possibility - yes, but hardly unlikely, but the mention of a third party bears looking into. If this third party was a submarine, where did it come from? The German Kriesmarine did not usually operate their U-Boats this far away from their home bases, range was a problem, unless they had means of being constantly refuelled. But as far as the possibility of KORMORAN being assisted by a submarine or submarines cannot be completely ruled out. So from whence did they come from?

As early as September 1940, Adolph Hitler had a meeting with the Italian representative Ciano and the Japanese Ambassador M.Kurusu. Japan was now under the new government of Prince Konoye who promised "new life" and "new order" to his people, in much the same way that Hitler had promised a "new Germany". Between them, they made a pact, an alliance that would bond them together in any conflict against the United States and her allies. Proof now that America was to become a target. Included in this pact, known as the Tripartite Pact was the following clauses" Germany, Italy and Japan undertake to assist one another with all political, economic, and military means when one of the three contracting parties is attacked or provoked by a power at present not involved in the European war or in the Sino-Japanese conflict. Article III of the Tripartite Pact. (portion of) Also included in the Terms of the Tripartite Pact were:

Germany and Italy recognise the leadership of Japan in the creation of a new order in the greater east Asiatic territory.
Article II of the Tripartite Pact. (portion of)

In late July - early August 1941, Britain and the USA froze Japanese assets in their countries, meaning that the 90% of fuel and aviation oil that imports from the USA will have to be found elsewhere. This pushes Japan closer to war with the USA and Britain. By September 6th when negotiations between the US Ambassador and Japan break down over the oil embargo, Prince Konoye of Japan prepares for war with the USA and his country would be ready for military actions from mid-October. By late October, Japanese forces were preparing bases in the Philippines and in Malaya, the most prominent of these was the Kurile Islands from where the Japanese fleet would depart for their attack on Pearl Harbour. Japanese submarines and reconnaissance aircraft were also active over a wide area from Singapore, New Guinea and the Marshall Islands.

It was a well known fact to the Japanese, that should they become involved in war with the United States, that the USA would establish bases possibly on the many islands in the western Pacific, in Australia or New Zealand which would be closer to Japan, as it would be impossible to sustain attacks from their present U.S. bases. Reconnaissance patrols around Australia would now be of utmost importance to them. Japan was now setting the stage.

Whether or not HSK KORMORAN was working in conjunction with the Japanese is not known. But movement of Japanese submarines along the western and northern coastline of Australia was. So was the observation of a number of unidentified aircraft over the Geraldton, Derby and Townsville areas. The Australian government state that although Allied forces could break the code of German naval vessels, they could not break the code used by the German merchant raiders, as shown by Defence Signals Directorate (DSD):

But the Inquiry (into the fate of HMAS Sydney) may wish to note that even if such transmissions did occur, there could have been no guarantee that a Sigint listening station would have picked them up. Even if they had been, the Allied units would not have been able to decipher them. The German Naval units used the Enigma device to encipher their message traffic, and most used what was known as the 'home' key, which was broken early in the War. However, armed merchant cruisers such as the Kormoran used the 'foreign' key, which was never broken. It should also be noted that Sigint would not have collected any signals transmitted by the Sydney itself; the Sigint effort was directed only at enemy communications.
Defence Signals Directorate (DSD)-The HMAS Sydney Inquiry

And what about the Japanese, they used the JN-25 code. The question here is; had anyone managed to break this JN-25 code. Evidently there is speculation that the British had done so. Maybe in Singapore, maybe on the Australian mainland. But this is only speculation, but if they had done so, then movements and messages would have told them the positions and reasons why they were along the Australian coast.

HMAS SYDNEY would have sailed the normal Sumatra - Fremantle route which is an almost direct line between the two locations. Captain Detmar on HSK KORMORAN would be aware of this. He positions himself along this line, then sails NW hoping to meet intercept HMAS SYDNEY. Remember, at this stage we do not know if the Japanese and Captain Detmar are in communication with each other, but one (or two) Japanese submarines lay in wait, or following in the wake of HSK KORMORAN. At 1556hrs, just off the coast near Geraldton, a lookout on HMAS SYDNEY spots a merchant ship. Shortly after, the German armed raider also spots the Australian cruiser and turns onto a westerly course, still maintaining her cruising speed. HMAS SYDNEY increases speed and alters onto a SSW course, unaware that she is falling into a trap.

The details of what followed are as described in "Possible Theory-1" up until the SYDNEY breaks away, disabled and on fire. The KORMORAN is on fire and listing, the crew have taken to the lifeboats and shortly afterwards HSK KORMORAN blows up and sinks. The difference here is that HMAS SYDNEY, now virtually disabled, no communication with the outside world and on fire has slowed down to just a few knots. Any submarine, even submerged could easily keep up, or even catch up the cruiser in such a disabled state. There would be plenty of time to position a submarine and fire a spread of torpedoes that finally would seal the fate of HMAS SYDNEY, and with the ship already listing badly it is a matter of just a few minutes before the Australian cruiser sinks below the surface, giving only those on the deck time to jump overboard which would be the natural instinct to do in such circumstances.

If the submarine was German, then it would have had no problems surfacing as Australia was at war with Germany. Here there would have been the slightest possibility that the submarine would have taken on any survivors. But had the submarine been Japanese. Japan had not formally declared war on anybody yet although the "Pearl Harbour" attack must have at least been on the drawing board. The question here would be if by any chance HMAS SYDNEY had detected them, they had heard no radio signals from the cruiser because they knew the Australians would be keeping radio silence, or had the SYDNEY managed to get one signal off on another frequency? They could not take the chance, the submarine surfaced and eliminated all evidence, making sure that nothing would drift to shore, or be observed by a spotter aircraft.

Meanwhile, the KORMORAN had sustained enough damage for she was ablaze and the order went out for the crew to 'abandon ship'. The sea off the West Australian coast was littered with small lifeboats and carley floats each of them containing the German officers and men of the KORMORAN. SYDNEY had slowly disappeared to the south-west leaving a pall of black smoke, and hardly any wake behind her. None of the crew of HMAS SYDNEY had abandoned her, was this because there was still a slight hope that she could make port. Was the steering completely out of action? How bad was the damage to her engines? Was the radio completely out of action, or was it that there was no power? Questions that we will never know.

Over 300 Germans were saved, many of then eventually being washed up on the shores of Western Australia, while many were picked up by allied ships and later handed over to the Australian authorities. Details of this action can never be truthfully be told because all we have is an unbalanced account of what really took place. So let us now look at how the German survivors from KORMORAN coped while awaiting rescue, and the accounts that they gave of the incident.