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A speech on the tactics and history of
the 95th (Rifle) Regiment of Foot
This page is owned by David Sadler who can be contacted at: c-d-s-a-d-l-e-r(at)webone.com.au (without the dashes)
This speech was presented to the Canberra branch of the Military Historical Society of Australia in August 1999. It was researched and written by David Sadler.

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THE 95^TH (RIFLE) REGIMENT OF FOOT
AND ITS TACTICS - 1800 TO 1815

My talk is about the sharp end of history - military life as it applied to the riflemen of the 95^th Regiment of Foot

their micro tactics as far as we can deduce them,

who they were, and

the role of light infantry and riflemen in particular in the late Napoleonic period.

I'm not a historian, just a re-enactor with an interest. But the tactics and people is where re-enacting meets history.

I will throw in some chronology here and there to catch the broader history of the 95^th Regiment.

This is definitely work in progress – the more I have looked into it and talked with other people, the more I realise that this particular subject is both complicated and subject to revision as new evidence emerges.

History of the re-enactment unit

The 95^th living history unit recreates the life and times of its famous namesake that saw service under the Duke of Wellington in Spain and at Waterloo - our unit focuses on the period 1809-1815. Members from around Australia aim to promote interest in military history in the wider community as well as having a great time themselves.

The 2^nd Bn 95^th Regiment was formed in Australia in1996 – but followed the formation of a unit in the UK. I first encountered the 95th in the UK in 1993 by accident – and a discussion with members revealed that getting the right equipment was difficult in the UK and was undoubtedly going to be impossible back in Australia. I found the Australian group last year via the Internet – and inquiries revealed an enthusiastic and growing group who had a very practical approach to re-enacting.

The big advance was locating a realistic source of Baker rifles - Poona gun works in India supplies a smoothbore version for around $600.

A rifled version made in Australia or the US comes in at around $2,700 - value for money no doubt, but beyond the pocket of most re-enactors.

Overall, the capital cost of the basic kit is around the cost of a desk top computer - but it is worth far more than the average PC in 5 or 10 years time.

Equipment

A Rifleman's equipment was as you see it with the addition of a back pack.

The uniform was consciously designed in dark green and black for camouflage. The exact shade of green is not known and might have been variable in any case because dyes in the early 1800s were not colour fast.

The green was certainly very dark - the French often reported riflemen as dressed in black, and the Riflemen themselves used the nicknamed sweeps.

Rifle. The Baker rifle was not new technology although Baker may have designed a particularly reliable and robust weapon. Complaints about it are rare, and I have never seen any reports of men abandoning their rifles in favour of muskets even in close action. Nevertheless, the rifle drill was modified to reduce the risk of dropping the weapon and damaging it.

Around 45,000 rifles were produced during the Napoleonic period – and they were supplied to Portugal and Brazil as well British forces.

Accuracy. Accounts of test firings are rare so it is difficult to determine just what the weapon's capabilities were in operational service. But we do know at little about expectations. Every rifleman had to be able to reliably hit individual soldiers - coyly called objects in drill manuals - at two hundred yards, and good marksmen were permitted to shoot at individuals at three hundred yards. Rifles were used against group targets like artillery batteries at double those ranges.

A smoothbore musket was accurate to about 50 or 100 yards although longer range fire could inflict casualties by chance.

Each rifleman carried a powder horn - not two, just one. One grade of powder suits all. Fine and course powder was an American thing probably due to the appalling quality of powder available in the antipodes until the US civil war.

Ammunition. Riflemen probably carried a mix of ammunition. 30 or more pre-measured powder cartridges would be carried in his cartridge box. For sniping, he probably used either a ready-made cartridge, which comprised just powder without a ball, or a measured quantity of powder from his powder horn. In both cases, a pre-patched ball was carried separately in his bullet pouch, and the firelock was primed from the powder horn rather than from the ready made cartridge. Accuracy at longer ranges depended on having a very good knowledge of the quality and quantity of powder being used - testing powder batches was probably an important reason for target practice (noting that powder sourced from the UK after 1800 was reportedly very good quality).

Probably, rifleman carried another 30 or more ready made cartridges with bullets - that is, both powder and ball as one unit like line regiments. These cartridges were used when rapid loading rather than accurate fire was required. The balls might have been either slightly smaller or not patched to ease getting them down the barrel quickly. Reserve ammunition supplies like those mentioned in the 1^st Bn's position at Waterloo probably comprised this sort of cartridge.

The Riflemen - Who were they?

Wellington’s famed, and often misunderstood, quote that his troops were drawn from the scum of the earth might have applied to some regiments but it did not apply to the 95^th. Many recruits seem to have been drawn from the regular Militia, and transferred to the 95^th out of a spirit of adventure and perhaps patriotism. Clearly, some recruits were attracted by the unique green uniform over all other considerations.

Money was certainly not an issue as the conditions of service in line regts were less attractive than in the Militia.

And those deemed not to have the right character were transferred out of the Regt to other units.

Warfare as practised by the 95^th required a different sort of soldier, and the founders of the regiment realised it. Discipline relied more on responsibility and education than on punishment and conformity. Riflemen at all ranks were expected to be leaders if more senior ranks were not present, and had to act independently. The true volunteer nature of the regiment aided this philosophy.

Many instances of initiative beyond the rank of the troops involved exist but the one perhaps best known to you is C.S. Forrester's Rifleman Dodd, who is based on a Sargent left behind at the Coa River. He escaped from the French and joined the Spanish guerrilla.

The quality of the soldiers showed in campaigns. In the most severe situations - retreating over long distances under severe pressure from both the French and collapsing supply systems - the 95^th's cohesion was better than most regiments. The best examples are the retreat to Corunna and Wellington's exit from Spain after temporarily capturing Madrid.

In both those campaigns, the riflemen were at the end of the line in every sense - at the rear, fending off the French while traversing a ruined countryside and seeing the potentially demoralising evidence that a disintegrating army leaves in its wake.

The early Years - Montevideo to Copenhagen

The 95^th was formed in 1800 - next year is the regiment's 200^thbirthday - although it was not titled the 95^th Regiment until 1803. From the start, its role was to provide specialist light infantry support to line divisions, initially on a trial basis. COLs Coote Manningham and Stewart were astute commanders with the vision to understand what they wanted and, to a large extent, the drive to get it. Morale and comprehensive training in skirmishing were seen as keys to success.

On 25^th August 1800, the rifles participated in an unsuccessful amphibious assault in northern Spain (Ferrol) - not a remarkable military debute but nevertheless the birthday of the rifles. In 1801, the rifles went to Copenhagen under Nelson, and saw action as sharpshooters.

In 1803, the threat of invasion prompted an event which was to have far-reaching consequences. Sir John Moore was placed in command of the Kent area, and he formed the light brigade with the 95^th at its core. The other regiments of the Light Brigade were the 43^rd and 52^nd.

The Light Bde and then the Light Division became one of the premier military units of the Napoleonic Wars.

In 1806-7, the unit saw action at Montevideo and Buenos Aires in South America - an inglorious campaign in which the Rifles acquitted themselves well.

In 1807, the rifles went to Copenhagen again - this time forming part of the amphibious assault force under Wellington.

Accounts do not suggest spectacular results but the inital single battalion was increased to two than three. And all through the period, Coote Manningham and Moore were busy training and gaining confidence in the tool they had created.

The 95^th was not unique in its role as skirmishers. And neither was the Napoleonic era necessarily characterised by the rise of the skirmisher. De Saxe clearly understood the value and utility of skirmishers by 1732, and his writings were influential throughout the West by the mid-1700s. Indeed, reading between the lines of first hand accounts of the English civil war suggests to an unbiased analyst like me that skirmishers were understood and employed then eg Okey's Dragoons at Naseby.

Perhaps the scale of skirmishing, and the integration of skirmishing into the battle tactics employed in major encounters was greatly improved over the course of the Napoleonic war.

An important reason for skirmishers not being prominent prior to the Napoleonic wars was an inability to reliably equip them with the two things necessary for their effective employment and survival:

a reliable weapon to enable them to make an impact on the battle field, and

sufficient mobility to get out of harm's way.

Prior to 1800, the short range muskets in use meant troops had very little opportunity to shoot and flee unless in unusually favourable terrain or equipped with horses. Rifles gave infantry:

a longer range weapon which enabled them to dominate more ground from the available cover; and

longer engagement ranges to make fleeing more practical.

Fleeing is an essential element of skirmish training, and was an absolute necessity for survival. Slow reload times meant that outnumbered and dispersed units would be quickly overwhelmed.

And, of course, the arrival of cavalry in any fight meant urgent measures were required to reduce skirmisher vulnerability.

What little we know of tactics in the early campaigns of the 95^th suggest the drill manual was applied somewhat more rigorously then in later campaigns.

Rifleman Harris implies that officers worked hard to get men into a proper dressed line, albeit in open order. They then worked to keep that line in order, apparently with limited regard to terrain.

Tactics with Moore in Spain

When the rifles embarked for Spain with Sir John Moore in 1807 (Wellington was initially in charge but side-lined after Vimiero), their tactics and training were well developed. And the need for continuous training was understood. While the transport fleet was anchored in Cork for weeks awaiting favourable winds, the rifles were taken ashore each day for skirmish training.

By the time of the battle at Vimiero, the French had certainly discovered the rifles. They report attacks being shot to shreds by men in green or black hiding behind every rock and bush, and the French name of grasshoppers is used. The inference is that the rigid adherence to order and line was disappearing fast.

By the end of the Corunna campaign, the 95^th'srecognition as an elite regt was undisputed, and it appeared to have no difficulty in attracting quality recruits. Recruiting was so strong that a third battalion was raised.

In addition, militia rifle regiments were formed in Britain (timing?), and Baker rifle production was greatly expanded.

But Corunna and the subsequent Walcheren debacle decimated the 95^th. Although the campaigns to this time provided the unit with much valuable combat experience and an opportunity to refine tactics, casualties from combat and disease were so heavy that only a minority of the men who embarked for Spain again in 1809 had seen any service.

The Wellington Years - better all the time (mostly)

One of the men who did survive Corunna was General Robert Craufurd - a flawed genius who's contribution to the 95^th ranks with Moore and Coote Manningham. He commanded the Light Bde during the retreat, and subsequently commanded the brigade and then division under Wellington. Craufurd was obstinate, prickly and sometimes rash in the face of the enemy - rashness eventually got him killed at Cuidad Rodrigo. But, perhaps as a result of the disintegration he saw on the retreat to Corunna, he made a set of regulations for his division which instilled an iron discipline on the march and made the division ready and able to enter combat at a moment's notice. Craufurd refined the regulations during the Wellington's defence of Portugal, and they integrated the highly effective battalions of his division into a fighting machine that rarely failed.

Wellington was usually very casualty-conscious (although less so than Bill Clinton). When he was despatched to the peninsula, his key instruction was to not lose the only field army Britain had. This had several ramifications but one was troop training. I have little doubt that it took about three years to make a good soldier in the first half of the 19^th century. Reducing casualties made it more likely that units would build up a core of experienced soldiers - and this applied particularly to light infantry.

And conversely, French troops were increasingly green as successive armies faded away under the pressures of war and famine in Spain.

Extent to which Wellington's divisions used skirmishers is not fully understood.

French witnesses report the British used skirmishers heavily either directly or by inference. Many of their post-action reports talk of breaking the first British line but stalling on the second. The first line was in fact skirmishers or, more correctly I guess, light infantry companies deployed forward in a relatively compact unit.

And there was probably a significant difference in the role and tactics of light infantry armed smooth-bore muskets as opposed to riflemen. Light infantry were likely deployed in an organised line comprising a mix of troops:

some in close order to act as rally points and to provide additional fire power; and

probably about half in two ranks in an extended order line - about two paces between each man. The number of paces between the ranks seems to have varied but could be up to 12.

Rifles on the other hand seemed to have used a much more irregular line, taking advantage of cover as available and using the longer range of the rifle to cover the areas more devoid of cover. Very likely, rifles were true skirmishers. No doubt, rifle units crossing the start line of an assault were in extended order but this was quickly modified to suit the ground. Flexibility and adaptability were the keys to success with minimal casualties.

Certainly the 95^th deployed almost always in skirmish order, whether in attack or defence although important exceptions exist eg Fuentes D'Onoro and Waterloo.

Rifle units, with their combination of training and weapon, could be far more effective than line units in skirmishing. On one sector at Salamanca, Wellington deployed two battalions of infantry as a heavy skirmish screen which was in contact with the French, suffering 2-3% casualties. He subsequently replaced the two infantry battalions with a half battalion of the 95^th - and the 95^th riflemen considered that they were largely spectators at the battle.

At Busaco (27 Sep 1810 - on the way back to Torres Verde Lines), skirmishers may have inflicted most of the casualties on attacking French columns with minimal losses themselves - although the ground was particularly favourable (steep hillside precluding cavalry support, numerous fall-back positions and lots of cover).

Re-enacting demonstrates that skirmishing in three ranks or the unstructured "cloud" reportedly used by the French at times was not possible as the constant movement and firing makes the risk of shooting a friend very great.

The role of the 95^th Rifles as specialist skirmish troops was reflected in their distribution within Wellington's Army. This was typically a battalion with each brigade of the Light Division, and the regiment's third battalion sometimes with another division.

The 60^th Rifles also provided a similar service to other divisions, as did some Portuguese troops armed with rifles.

From 1809 to 1812, Wellington was essentially on the defensive. His direction to preserve his army dictated prudence. But these were busy years for the rifles and the light division. The division was routinely deployed to watch the French if they were close, or watch the approaches to Portugal if the French had drawn back into Spain to resupply.

1812-1813 saw Wellington on the offensive, and the 95^th adapting skirmish tactics to the attack rather than defence. Several accounts note assaults on French positions by the 95^th acting without line infantry. Observers remarked on their ability to take advantage of every fold in the ground, and to do the task with far fewer casualties than other units. Extended order was used but adjusted to take advantage of cover. But some observers note the use of "supports" following on behind the skirmish line. It would seem the rifles used the skirmish line to cover the supports, and the supports may have participated in the final bayonet charge to dislodge the French.

By 1812-13, Wellington's command and control was team was very experienced, and many of the units in the Army had extensive combat experience. Wellington was able to use force and manoeuvre on a much larger scale than previously. His approach march on Vitoria demonstrated it on a strategic scale - his manoeuvres basically forced the french to abandon central Spain without a shot being fired. And his use of multiple columns to attack the French at Vitoria showed a tactical confidence which almost paid off.

Waterloo: multi-role warfare

Waterloo shows the 95^th Regiment at its versatile best - elements were involved in long approach marches, skirmishing, stubborn defence and assault in conventional infantry formations.

The 1^st Bn was deployed in Wellington's centre, taking cover in a sandpit and along a hedge to the left of Le Haye Saint Farm. This was a key position that the rifles left clogged with French casualties at the end of the day. And after being engaged continuously through the day, the battalion advanced with the rest, and finished the day two miles towards Paris.

Nevertheless, casualties to the left of LeHaye sainte were so severe that it is probably just as well that Ney's assault with the Guarde veered to the right of the farm. The Rifles and line regiments to the left formed little more than a thick skirmish line by the evening. But Ney might have been forced into his redirection due to the clogged ground and stalled units in front of the sandpit.

The Second battalion participated on Wellington's right as a regular line unit - the nature of the ground and the cavalry threat forced the battalion to remain in close order or squares when the French cavalry charged. The Battalion participated in the defeat of the Imperial Guards, and was one of the leading units in the final counter attack.

Elements of the 3^rd Battalion were also present but had a relatively quiet time fending off French skirmishers to the right of the line.

One observer after the battle assessed that if half the British Army were riflemen, it would be invincible.

QUESTIONS AND DISCUSSION PLEASE