More nightness

Another night session at Bankstown.

Julien commented on one of my recent posts - he happened to attend the same session of night circuits as myself a few weeks ago. We didn't fly together, but G'day Julien if you're reading this. I'll be reading your blog with interest in the future.

Daniel Martin was our instructor for the session, a very experienced and agreeably laid back instructor at Schofields. Grahame Smith and Dave Roberts were my fellow acolytes. Grahame took us out to show us how it was done, and really gave us something to aim for. Grahame never got around to completing his night VFR rating, but is an experienced IFR pilot and it showed in his precise speed control and effective instrument scan. He took it round for three good circuits, copping a nasty patch of slipstream for an Archer in front of us. It threw the aircraft off at least 30 degrees angle of bank shortly after take off and really got our attention. Landed, taxi back and shut down.

Now my turn. Took it around for one good circuit and a squeaker of a landing. Normally this would be a good thing, but I would rather have my landings be a little on the firm side at night, rather than grope around in the flare and float too high. The next circuit was ok and the landing this time was firm, but rather too hard. A Duchess was on its way into the circuit and the tower requested we extend out downwind leg to accommodate it. I choose to turn too early, thinking a Duchess would be a bit faster than our Warrior. Pilots who have flown a Duchess may choose to chuckle at my expense at this point. I also didn't twig to the transmission that preceded, advising the Duchess to slow to follow a Liberty. We ended up going too close behind, and being asked to go around. It's a good thing to get to practice a go around at night, I rationalised. The last circuit was good up until it was my time to receive a fright.

On late final we encountered wake turbulence as Grahame had earlier. And there's no wake turbulence quite like wake turbulence at 100 feet. The left wing dropped past 30 degrees and I put in a boot full of right rudder to pick it up. It wasn't done with us though and we dropped first the left and then the right wing during the flare, probably no more than 10 feet off the ground. The landing was surprisingly good, taxi back and shutdown to allow Dave to have a go and for my heart rate to retrun to normal. Dan speculated that because the night was so still and calm, wake turbulence was hanging around for longer rather than being broken up by passing currents as it would during the day. Another good lesson there, campers.

Unfortunately as Dave is a pre-solo student we weren't permitted to be on board while he flew the circuit, so Grahame and I waved him good night and wandered back to the clubhouse, which was a decidedly warmer place to be.

The Heartland of Choad

Eastern Europe. The New New Jersey.

This post no good without pics

Flew again last Friday 29th May. Took a workmate Brett along for the ride. Apologies for the tardiness of this post, but I was expecting to get some photos from my passenger to post, who has since told me the battery in his camera died and so he can't yet retrieve the images from it. Brett's father was a flight engineer for QANTAS for many years, and grew up near the northern beaches of Sydney, where a great many QANTAS flight crew seem to reside, so I took a route I've flown a few times before that goes as close to Sydney Harbour whilst remaining outside controlled airspace.

The weather had been poor for several weeks leading up to the flight, the confluence of low and high pressure systems off the coast brought day after day of heavy rain, flooding and low cloud. The day of the flight, though, was nice and clear, some cloud but not enough to effect the flight. The aircraft, SFA, had not been flown since the 17th, and a fuel drain revealed it had soaked up a fair bit of water. I had never seen quite so much water in a fuel tank, I must have rocked and drained the tanks a dozen times each before they came up clear of water.

Startup, taxi out, extended run up on both tanks to make sure they weren't going to quit with water contamination after takeoff and out to the runway. A few months earlier a Chieftain had run off the end of the runway after a failed aborted takeoff, the report blaming water contamination for the loss of engine power.

North via the VFR lane to Hornsby, then east to the coast north of Long Reef, one orbit over the beach, but clearly too cold for naked sunbathers, then north to Barrenjoey Head lighthouse, west to Brooklyn Bridge, then south back the VFR return lane to Bankstown. Encountered a couple of minor showers along the way back, prompting my passenger to ask what I used to keep the windscreen clear of water.

'Airspeed,' I replied.

Into the circuit at Bankstown, too close behind another Archer in front prompted a 'waggle your wings SFA' request so the tower could differentiate us, then having to go around. I thought we had sufficient spacing, but the tower controllers were handing over, I think the new controller was erring on the side of caution until he had a handle on the circuit traffic.

Around we go again, on short final my passenger started asking questions about the layout of the field, which I tried to answer, but probably shouldn't have. My fault for not briefing him to stay quiet during our approach and landing.

A nice, fun flight, and easily done within the 1.5 hour booking we had.

And another one, this time with nightness

Out to the club again, for our regular night flying event, in which we take turns to fly some night circuits. It's a great night, and good fun all round. The general idea is three club members and an instructor take a club aircraft out, each club member taking it in turns to make three night landings before switching seats with another club member, and so on. We switch seats on the ground, of course. This satisfies our recency requirements for legal reasons, the club puts on a dinner and so it becomes a social event, too.

I was a bit nervous before I went out that I wouldn't remember everything, but it all felt very natural, although my instrument scan was slow and haphazard, which I will work on.

Finally, a new flying post

At Bankstown again today, just to fly some practice circuits for the recency and proficiency that's in it. It took some cajoling at the front counter to establish my credentials.

"Who's your instructor?"

I don't have an instructor. I have a licence.

"When was you last flight review? It's not within the last year."

Yes, I know, but it is within the last two. That's why it used to be called a biannual flight review. I glads they changed the name to make it less clear.

"The computer says your medical has expired."

Well, my class one medical expired, but my class two medical lasts for another three years. And anyway, I've since renewed it and got the paperwork back.

And so, eventually, almost reluctantly, I got the keys to my favourite Archer, SFA. Preflight, nothing out of the ordinary, a few stray nicks on the prop that will need attention before too long.

Startup, SFA is a bit quirky on starting up, she always needs three pumps on the prime to turn over, but she won't start on the first crank. Prime again and she fires almost straight away after cranking again. The first time I ever flew SFA, I picked it up at the mechanics, taking two passengers for a harbour scenic. The previous Archers I had started did not even need a prime, just a quick boost with the fuel pump and away they went. When that did not work, I primed. She didn't start. I rang the club and Nelson advised me to prime and try again. She fired straight away. Now that I know this quirk, I feel more comfortable with this aeroplane. She is my club favourite.

Taxi out, and trapped behind a C152 with two white shirted, epauletted pilots aboard. A CPL student and instructor, or two CPL students, or two student instructors, and clearly in no hurry to get out to the runway. I have no problem with people who taxi slowly, taxiing too fast is a bad habit I have picked up from impatient instructors. Nevertheless, I idle the engine the whole way and have to drag the brakes to keep from chewing up their rudder. All the way around the airport from the northern to the southern side, which is the training runway.

Run up, the engine is well warm from our extended taxi run, instruments ok, carb heat works, magnetos ok, idle ok, cockpit checks complete, controls full free and correct, hatches and harnesses all secure. My C152 roadblock is beside me and I manage to get to the holding point before them.

I hold, then cleared to line up, and then cleared to take off. Lights on, heels on the floor to avoid dragging the brakes, power up, check the oil pressure is fine, airspeed indicator alive and rising, maintain centreline with rudder. 65 knots and lift the nose wheel, the Archer rises of its own accord, leaving the runway behind.

I am told the preceding traffic is a Cherokee on a very wide downwind leg. This is tower controller talk for I am getting frustrated with the pilot of this Cherokee and I am going to let everyone know what I think of their flying skills. He is right, the aeroplane in front of me is 2-3 times further out than it should be. I drift out as well, it will be difficult for me to stay behind it otherwise. I drop some stages of flap to slow down. It turns base after a very long downwind, pushing me out to avoid cutting it off, lines up on final and receives a call clearing it to land. No reply, the tower tries twice more without acknowledgement. The pilot lands anyway, but I have to go around, then request and am cleared to make an early crosswind turn back into the circuit. I hear the tower ask the pilot for a radio check, the pilot says she reads him 4. The tower asks why she did not acknowledge the previous transmissions. We must have been talking she says.

This sets the tone for the following 1.2 hours. I am constantly throttling back and dropping stages of flap to avoid running too close behind other aircraft. I go around three times. I am cleared to land when I am about 50 feet above the ground on the verge of going around. Consequently my landings are safe, but not things of beauty. My second last landing is a big bounce. I realise I am still flying, so I pour the coals on and call it a day. I request the northern runway to shorten my trip back to the club, and I am denied - it is just too busy. The Cherokee landing in front of me lands, then detours sideways, narrowly avoiding running onto the grass, saving it at the last moment. There is no wind to speak of.

My last landing is a good one, a nice little squeaker, although I carried a bit too much speed and miss the first taxiway. I take the second, and unfortunately the C152 behind me has to go around. Sorry dude, but welcome to my world. I hold and wait to cross the centre runway. A C152 in motors down the centre runway, practising aborted takeoffs. After it passes I am cleared to cross the centre runway but hold short of the northern runway. Another C152 lands on this runway and takes the exit in front of me. I am cleared to cross the runway behind the C152 and expedite. Expedite means do it now, without delay, make it fast. I see an aeroplane is lined up on this runway, waiting to take off. Unfortunately the C152 in front of me is taking his time exiting the runway and has decided to go way to another aeroplane taxiing in front of him. I briefly entertain the notion of reminding the pilot that aircraft exiting runways have right of way, and that he is holding the whole show up, but I don't, the tower can see the whole thing.

I taxi back to the club, behind the dawdling C152, the two pilots hanging their elbows out the open windows as if on a Sunday drive. I idle the engine again, and drag the brakes.

I park, shutdown and secure the aircraft.

Thus ends a very frustrating training session at Bankstown airport. It's getting so that the only days I can train out here are days with a stiff crosswind or a damp runway, when everyone else is forbidden to come out and fly, lest they bend the school's favourite C152. On the plus side, I didn't seem to have forgotten anything, I view it as a positive that flying daytime circuits is a waste of time for me - I need to get out and about and get some cross country flying under my belt again.

Are you Chris Parkes?

When I came in to work tonight there was an email waiting for me, addressed to Chris Parkes, informing me that I was responsible for the executive summary of some project I had not the faintest clue about. Of course, it wasn't for me, it was Chris Parkes who lives in Ireland, works for HP and sometimes gets my emails, as I get his.

A few years ago, I saw a show called 'Are You Dave Gorman?' in which Dave Gorman travelled around the world meeting as many people with the same name as his to establish whether or not Dave Gorman is a common name.

I've often wanted to do the same. Google you own name, if you haven't already, and you are likely to find a strange collection of individuals with your name. Some of mine are fascinating. Nuclear physicists, Reiki healers, butlers, football managers, sound engineers. Chris Parkes really is a fascinating fellow. I hope to meet him one day.

Fast Finger Freddy strikes again

Wrong computer numbers caused Emirates jet to almost crash at Melbourne Airport

Tail Strike -A6-ERG, Airbus A340-500, Melbourne Airport, VIC, 20 March 2009

I didn't initially realise just how serious this incident was. According to the preliminary report the aircraft didn't actually start climbing until 300 metres past the end of the runway, taking out a strobe light and two radio transmitters along the way.

Systems failure, not people failure

Triple-0 sarcasm a 'disease'

This is a tragic case, and I don't presume to know all of the technical details, but I can see a parallel with many tragic aviation incidents. There were many factors that lead to the death of David Ireland, but I am of the opinion that the attitude of the 000 operators was just a link in the chain of events, rather than the root cause.

Firstly, the majority of 000 calls are dealt with professionally and effectively - these calls were not. Why?

I would hazard a guess that the prank or hoax calls that 000 receives must make the operators cynical whenever they receive a call which is out of the ordinary and for which details are scant, which is certainly the case here. The caller was on a mobile, in the middle of nowhere, not knowing where he was, cutting off calls abruptly when his signal dropped out, shouting to make himself heard - all behaviours which might make an operator think 'prank.'

The operators are city based, and in an urban setting it is easy to forget that out in the bush, services, streets, all sorts of 'normal' facilities simply don't exist. I fly into many country airports where there is no pay phone, no internet, no radio or phone reception, no nothing. The city based air traffic controllers can be a little sarcastic when you try and lodge a flight plan in the air or get some met info, simply because they forget that some places still exist without curb guttering and coffee shopes every ten feet.

Judging for the article the operators follow a script of sorts, inputting information into a computer system which allows them to communicate the relevant details to the emergency services. Where the system fell down was where they had received a call where none of the information matched that allowable by the computer system. As far as it was concerned there was no emergency. Furthermore the information they collected did not get to the search parties quickly enough, because there is an unspecified impediment to emailing it, it had to be printed and presumably delivered to where it wss needed by hand.

He agreed the behaviour of three operators was worthy of an internal investigation and possible action. Two operators had been "counselled" about their behaviour.

This is dodging the issue. I can only imagine the guilt these operators feel, admonishing them is unlikely to fix the problem now or in the future. All blaming the operators is likely to do is make the guy at the top look like he is taking action. Until the inherent failings in the system are acknowledged and corrected all that will do is delay the inevitable - history repeating itself.

The Easter Bunny meets an unfortunate end.

I have some bad news, kids. The Easter Bunny went to visit Santa Claus and, uh, well...

Pilot found guilty, all other parties try to look innocent

Despair as Garuda pilot gets two years

I'm not a lawyer, so I'm not going to get into the appropriateness of the sentence or anything else, but I'm personally of the opinion that justice was not fully served and that aviation in Indonesia is not substantially any safer than before the Garuda incident.

My reasoning is that aviation accidents rarely, if ever, have a sole cause. This incident is no different. The poor decision making of the pilot was merely one link in the chain of events, one more hole in a slice of swiss cheese that resulted in the deaths of 21 people.

Where, for example, were the aerodrome operators, the airline executives, the regulators who were, in some way, also culpable for the incident?

AE-2007-015: Boeing 737-497, PK-GZC; Adi Sucipto Airport, Yogyakarta, Indonesia; 7 March 2007

The aircraft exceeded its speed limit of 250 knots below 10,000 feet, air traffic control either had no way of identifying this, or chose to do nothing.

The 1st officer did not appear to have been given the required simulator checks by the airline.

The regulator, the DGCA, had only conducted two safety audits of the airline during the previous ten year period. Most general aviation flying schools in Australia get audited more regularly than that, usually once a year.

The fire-fighting units were dispatched to to the crash site, only to find themselves trapped behind an airport perimeter fence 130 metres away. The fire-fighting units themselves did not comply with ICAO recommendations, and even if they had been able to get past the fence, were ill-equipped to perform the task required of them.

Garuda took 33 hours to provide the cargo manifest to authorities - so long, in fact, that it negated the whole point of providing it in the first place.

The runway itself did not meet ICAO standards, and the DGCA had failed to notify the ICAO of this difference.

The flight data recorder did not record all of the parameters it was required to record, as the unit was a digital unit, and unable to record the analogue input.

Pilot guilty, but is flying in Indonesia any safer?

The answer appears to be a little, but not much. The EU has still banned Indonesian airlines from flying in EU airspace, a step Australia appears unwilling to take, probably due to political considerations.

The conclusion that I draw from all of this is; until a blame culture is overcome, until there is a willingness to acknowledge inadequacies, the system cannot be substantially improved. This is true of all organisations, in all fields. Burying ones head in the sand and ignoring criticism only delays the inevitable.

The was pilot error involved in this incident - but the root causes went much deeper.