Rabbit Hemorrhagic Disease (RCD)
Concerns by Dr David O.Matson MD.,Ph.D
(USA specialist in caliciviruses)
Date: Tue, 06 Feb 1996 10:22:37 -0400 (EDT)
From: MATSON@PICARD.EVMS.EDU
RABBIT VIRAL HEMORRHAGIC DISEASES (4)
======================================
I originally learned about the October release/escape of the rabbit
hemorrhagic disease calicivirus from the CSIRO study site through a
forwarded PROMED posting. I thought I would inquire through PROMED
of additional information about this event as I have been drawn into
the public discussion of the matter.
These are some of my concerns:
1. Caliciviruses fall into five genomic groups by genomic
organization and degree of shared sequence identity, as follows:
Group Known Hosts Examples
---------------------
Small round structured viruses Humans Norwalk, Snow Mountain,
and Hawaii viruses
Hepatitis E virus Humans hepatitis E strains of
Burma, Mexico, India,
Muslim states of former
USSR
Rabbit CV-like Rabbits rabbit hemorrhagic disease
virus of China, Germany,
Spain; European brown hare
syndrome virus
Sapporo-like Humans Sapporo calicivirus/82/
Japan; Sapporo calicivirus/
86/Houston; Sapporo
calicivirus/90/Houston;
Manchester and Plymouth
viruses
Feline calicivirus-like Cats, chimpanzee, FCV F4, FCV-CFI, FCV-F9,
sea lion, dolphin, Pan-1, Tur-1,SMSVs 1, 4,
mussel, sea otter, 13, 15, 17
Aruba Island rattlesnake
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The assortment of strains using phylogenetic methods based upon sequence
analysis and the assortment of strains according to genomic organization
resulted in identical clustering of strains. The concordance of the two
assortment methods brings a high level of certainty to the results. The
best way for me to show you this is to FAX interested individuals two
figures. If you can provide me a FAX number, the figures will follow
quickly.
Conclusions from phylogenetic analyses that led to the assortment into
five groups include:
a. Small round structured viruses (SRSVs) are distinct and distant from
other groups.
b. Sapporo-like human caliciviruses cluster more closely to rabbit CV-like
and FCV-like animal CVs than to hepatitis E or SRSVs.
c. The FCV-like animal CV group includes strains of marine and terrestrial
origin, establishing the hypothesis made 20 years ago that there is/has
been movement of caliciviruses between marine and terrestrial reservoirs/
hosts.
d. The "proximity" of the Sapporo-like human caliciviruses and the two
animal CV groups indicates that Sapporo-like CVs are/have been transmitted
between animals and humans. Whether such transmission occurs now or
remotely in the past is uncertain.
e. The primate CV, Pan-1, lies firmly within the FCV-like group. This means
members of four of the five known CV groups have infected primates.
f. SMSV-5, a member of the FCV-like group, caused infection in a laboratory
worker with manifestations of illness like those seen in the original sea
lion host. This means four of the five known CV groups have infected
humans.
g. The only group not yet found in humans is the rabbit CV-like strains.
h. The genome of the Sapporo-like CVs forms a superset for the rabbit CV-like
and hepatitis E caliciviruses, with respect to genome organization. This
is most clear in the figure I will FAX to you. By this, I mean that
Sapporo-like HuCVs have the nonstructural polyprotein and the capsid gene
in the same frame, probably capable of being synthesized in one long
polyprotein. At the beginning of the capsid gene is another predicted
protein product that overlaps the capsid gene, in another frame. The
function of the protein encoded by this gene is unknown, but we know, at
least for hepatitis E virus, that antibody to a protein encoded by a gene
at this location is made in natural infections. Another predicted protein
is located after the capsid gene. Sapporo-like HuCVs have all four of
these genes, rabbit-like AnCVs have three of them, and hepatitis E virus
has a different complement of three. The presence of "shared" genes does
not imply that the functions of those genes are the same. However, the
presence of them and their location requires common mechanisms for their
expression during replication. The conclusion is, then, that the Sapporo-
like HuCVs provide at least a biologic link of sorts between the rabbit
and hepatitis E caliciviruses.
2. The CSIRO has expressed confidence that there have been no reports of
infection of humans by the rabbit hemorrhagic disease calicivirus during
greater than 10 years of observation in sites where RHDV occurs. I think
that experience is valid and worthy of full consideration. My caveats are:
Has anybody looked for evidence of human infection in humans, such as
performing serosurveys or targeted studies of rabbit handlers, foresters,
game wardens, veterinarians, zoo workers, to see if they have antibody? We
know CVs cross species boundaries, but does RHDV? Human disease may be
absent, but infection might not be.
3. Although CSIRO has cited stability of the RHDV genome across a broad
geographic range and time as another reason not to be concerned about
RHDV's potential for virulence, a narrow range of sequence variation is
the expected result. The explosiveness and mortality of the RHDV syndrome
imply a recent introduction of the virus into the species/genus. From
where? Outbreak/epidemic strains tend to be more closely related to each
other than strains collected after a pathogen has been in the host for
many decades. Variation within human caliciviruses required application
of broadly reactive methods, such as RT-PCR using conserved primers, to
samples that were electon microscopy-negative. Have similarly
comprehensive methods been applied to look for diversity of RHDV among
field isolates?
We know already that RHDV and the similar European Brown Hare Syndrome
calivirus are different enough from each other to be considered
potentially different serotypes, based upon the degree of difference
observed between them.
Although CSIRO has been focusing on the limited genetic variability of
the rabbit calicivirus, apparently to provide reassurance as to the
safety of the release, the existence of genomic and antigenic variability
may be a "blessing" for the eradication program. It might be possible to
adapt the Brown Hare rabbit calicivirus to the bunnies in Australia. If
the genomic differences between the RHDV and EBHS caliciviruses correspond
to antigenic differences, such adaption might permit a "two-hit" challenge
to the wild Australian rabbits, permitting the eradication program to
succeed. By focusing on the presumed "stability" and "limited variation"
of RHDV, the CSIRO researchers may have "focused" themselves out of viable
solutions that would make their rabbit calicivirus program really succeed.
4. It is very difficult to get an understanding of CSIRO activities through
in-house publications and press releases. Such documents are not readily
available and do not engender the same peer review as formal publication.
The fact that CSIRO devloped plans for the RHDV without publication in
the scientific literature means that they do not appear to have availed
themselves of of peer comments that might have prevented the premature
escape of the virus.
5. Were experiments conducted by the CSIRO appropriate to evaluate the risk
of interspecies spread? People I respect with experience in this area
have doubts.
6. What is the virulence factor that causes death in rabbits? Is this factor
shared by other calicivirus strains?
7. What is the specificity of the assays for RHDV and antibody to RHDV? What
studies were done in humans and animals in Australia to document absence
of cross-reacting antibodies to ensure that post-release surveillance
would yield valid conclusions?
8. What is the original source of the RHDV? Epidemiologic evidence of high
mortality and rapid spread in rabbits suggest that RHDV was new to rabbits
15 years ago or so. Where did it come from? Knowing where it came from
would provide for good planning in a deliberate release.
Unfortunately, these concerns have not been given what I consider to be proper
attention by CSIRO or the supervisory board advocating this virus release. I
am hoping that a scientific forum can be developed where these concerns
are discussed by interested parties.
David O. Matson, M.D., Ph.D.
Center for Pediatric Research
Norfolk, Virginia