Stephen E. Jones

Creation/Evolution Quotes: Unclassified quotes: January 2010

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The following are quotes added to my Unclassified Quotes database in January 2010.
The date format is dd/mm/yy. See copyright conditions at end.

[Index: Feb, Mar, Apr, May, Jun, Jul, Aug, Sep, Oct, Nov, Dec]


10/01/2010
"The sciences logically require a metaphysic of this sort. Our greatest natural philosopher thinks it is also 
the metaphysic out of which they originally grew. Professor Whitehead points out that centuries of belief in 
a God who combined ` the personal energy of Jehovah ` with ` the rationality of a Greek philosopher' 
[Whitehead, A.N., "Science and the Modern World," Penguin: Harmondsworth UK, 1926, Reprinted, 1938, 
p.24] first produced that firm expectation of systematic order which rendered possible the birth of modern 
science. Men became scientific because they expected Law in Nature, and they expected Law in Nature 
because they believed in a Legislator. In most modern scientists this belief has died: it will be interesting to 
see how long their confidence in uniformity survives it. Two significant developments have already 
appeared-the hypothesis of a lawless sub-nature, and the surrender of the claim that science is true. We may 
be living nearer than we suppose to the end of the Scientific Age." (Lewis, C.S*, "Miracles: A Preliminary 
Study," [1947], Fontana: London, Second edition, 1960, Reprinted, 1963, pp.109-110)

10/01/2010
"But if we admit God, must we admit Miracle? Indeed, indeed, you have no security against it. That is the 
bargain. Theology says to you in effect, `Admit God and with Him the risk of a few miracles, and I in return 
will ratify your faith in uniformity as regards the overwhelming majority of events.' The philosophy which 
forbids you to make uniformity absolute is also the philosophy which offers you solid grounds for believing 
it to be general, to be almost absolute. The Being who threatens Nature's claim to omnipotence confirms 
her in her lawful occasions. Give as this ha'porth of tar and we will save the ship. The alternative is really 
much worse. Try to make Nature absolute and you find that her uniformity is not even probable. By claiming 
too much, you get nothing. You get the deadlock as in Hume. Theology offers you a working arrangement 
which leaves the scientist free to continue his experiments and the Christian to continue his prayers." (Lewis 
C.S*, "Miracles: A Preliminary Study," [1947], Fontana: London, Second Edition, 1963, Reprinted, p.110. 
Emphasis in original) 

15/01/2010
"But Calvin gave forcible emphasis to the distinction between predestination and foreknowledge. `We say 
rightly that [God] foresees all things, even as he disposes of them; but it is confusing everything to say that 
God elects and rejects according to his foresight of this or that. When we attribute foreknowledge to God, 
we mean that all things have always been and eternally remain under his observation, so that nothing is 
either future or past to his knowledge: he sees and regards them in the truth, as though they were before his 
face. We say that this foreknowledge extends throughout the circuit of the world and over all his creatures. 
We call predestination the eternal decree of God by which he decided what he would do with each man. For 
he does not create them all in like condition, but ordains some to eternal life, the others to eternal 
damnation.' [Inst. III, 21, 5] The distinction was vital to him, for we find him frequently returning to it even 
in his sermons, in order to throw into relief the absolutely gratuitous nature of election. Election, like 
reprobation, is an entirely free act of the divine will. `If we ask why God takes pity on some, and why he lets 
go of the others and leaves them, there is no other answer but that it pleased him to do so.' [Sermon on 
Ephesians 1.3-4]" (Wendel, F.*, "Calvin: The Origins and Development of His Religious Thought," [1950], 
Mairet, P., transl., Fontana: London, 1963, Reprinted, 1965, pp.272-273) 

15/01/2010
"Predestination. Predestination is the plan or purpose of God respecting His moral creatures. It pertains to 
men, both good and bad, to angels and devils, and to Christ as the Mediator. Predestination includes two 
parts, namely, election and reprobation." (Berkhof, L.*, "A Summary of Christian Doctrine," [1938], Banner 
of Truth Trust: London, British edition, 1960, Third impression, 1968, p.43. Emphasis original)

15/01/2010
"Election. The Bible speaks of election in more than one sense, as (1) the election of Israel as the Old 
Testament people of God, Deut. 4:37; 7:6-8; 10:15; Hos. 13:5; (2) the election of persons to some special 
office or service, Dent. 18:5; I Sam. 10:24; Ps. 78:70; and (3) the election of individuals unto salvation, Matt. 
22:14; Rom. 11:5; Eph. 1:4. The last is the election to which we refer in this connection. It may be defined as 
God's eternal purpose to save some of the human race in and by Jesus Christ." (Berkhof, L.*, "A Summary 
of Christian Doctrine," [1938], Banner of Truth Trust: London, British edition, 1960, Third impression, 1968, 
pp.43-44. Emphasis original)

15/01/2010
"Reprobation. The doctrine of election naturally implies that God did not intend to save all. If He 
purposed to save some, He naturally also purposed not to save others. This is also in harmony with the 
teachings of Scripture, Matt. 11:25, 26; Rom. 9:13, 17, 18, 21, 22; 11:7, 8; II Pet. 2:9; Jude 4. Reprobation may 
be defined as God's eternal purpose to pass some men by with the operation of His special grace, and to 
punish them for their sin. It really embodies a twofold purpose therefore: (1) to pass some by in the bestowal 
of saving grace; and (2) to punish them for their sins." (Berkhof, L.*, "A Summary of Christian Doctrine," 
[1938], Banner of Truth Trust: London, British edition, 1960, Third impression, 1968, p.44. Emphasis original)

15/01/2010
"Objection to Predestination It is sometimes said that the doctrine of predestination exposes God to the 
charge of injustice. But this is hardly correct. We could speak of injustice only if man had a claim on God, 
and God owed man eternal salvation. But the situation is entirely different if all men have forfeited the 
blessings of God, as they have. No one has the right to call God to account for electing some and rejecting 
others. He would have been perfectly just, if He had not saved any, Matt. 20:14, 15; Rom. 9:14, 15." (Berkhof, 
L.*, "A Summary of Christian Doctrine," [1938], Banner of Truth Trust: London, British edition, 1960, Third 
impression, 1968, p.44. Emphasis original)

15/01/2010
"To memorize. Passages pertaining to: a. God's decree in general: Eph. 1:11. `In whom also we were 
made a heritage, having been foreordained according to the purpose of Him who worketh all things after the 
counsel of His will.' Ps. 33:11. `The counsel of Jehovah standeth fast forever, the thoughts of His heart to all 
generations.' Isa. 46:10. `Declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times things that are not yet 
done; saying, My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure.'" (Berkhof, L.*, "A Summary of Christian 
Doctrine," [1938], Banner of Truth Trust: London, British edition, 1960, Third impression, 1968, p.44. 
Emphasis original)

15/01/2010
"b. Predestination: Eph. 1:11, cf. above under a. Ps. 2:7. `I will tell of the decree: Jehovah said unto me, 
Thou art my Son; this day have I begotten Thee.' Eph. 1:4, 5. `Even as He chose us in Him before the 
foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without blemish before Him in love, having 
foreordained us unto adoption as sons through Jesus Christ unto Himself, according to the good pleasure 
of His will.' Rom. 11:5. `Even so then at this present time also there is a remnant according to the election of 
grace.' Rom. 9:13. `Even as it is written, Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated.' Rom. 9:18. `So then He hath mercy 
on whom He will, and whom He will He hardeneth." (Berkhof, L.*, "A Summary of Christian Doctrine," 
[1938], Banner of Truth Trust: London, British edition, 1960, Third impression, 1968, p.45. Emphasis original) 

17/01/2010
"Heaven, like hell, is eternal, and yet we should remember that the Greek words aidios and aionios do 
not mean `endless' so much as `agelong' or `belonging to the ages.' They refer to the quality more than to 
the length of life, though certainly in the case of those who are in heaven we can affirm their continuance in 
fellowship with God throughout all ages, since nothing will ever again be able to separate them from his 
unquenchable and indomitable love (Rom. 8:38, 39)." (Bloesch, D.G.*, "Essentials of Evangelical Theology, 
Volume Two: Life, Ministry, and Hope," [1978], HarperCollins: San Francisco CA, 1982, p.229)

23/01/2010
"Most philosophers think Pascal's Wager is the weakest of all arguments for believing in the existence of 
God. Pascal thought it was the strongest. After finishing the argument in his Pensées, he wrote, `This is 
conclusive, and if men are capable of any truth, this is it.' That is the only time Pascal ever wrote a sentence 
like that, for he was one of the most sceptical philosophers who ever wrote." (Kreeft, P.*, "Argument from 
Pascal's Wager," in Kreeft, P., "Fundamentals of the Faith: Essays in Christian Apologetics," Ignatius Press: 
San Francisco CA, 1988)

23/01/2010
"Suppose someone terribly precious to you lay dying, and the doctor offered to try a new `miracle drug' that 
he could not guarantee but that seemed to have a 50-50 chance of saving your beloved friend's life. Would it 
be reasonable to try it, even if it cost a little money? And suppose it were free- wouldn't it be utterly 
reasonable to try it and unreasonable not to? Suppose you hear reports that your house is on fire and your 
children are inside. You do not know whether the reports are true or false. What is the reasonable thing to 
do-to ignore them or to take the time to run home or at least phone home just in case the reports are true? 
Suppose a winning sweepstakes ticket is worth a million dollars, and there are only two tickets left. You 
know that one of them is the winning ticket, while the other is worth nothing, and you are allowed to buy 
only one of the two tickets, at random. Would it be a good investment to spend a dollar on the good chance 
of winning a million? No reasonable person can be or ever is in doubt in such cases. But deciding whether 
to believe in God is a case like these, argues Pascal. It is therefore the height of folly not to `bet' on God, 
even if you have no certainty, no proof, no guarantee that your bet will win. Atheism is a terrible bet. It 
gives you no chance of winning the prize." (Kreeft, P.*, "Argument from Pascal's Wager," in Kreeft, P., 
"Fundamentals of the Faith: Essays in Christian Apologetics," Ignatius Press: San Francisco CA, 1988)

23/01/2010
"To understand Pascal's Wager you have to understand the background of the argument. Pascal lived in a 
time of great scepticism. Medieval philosophy was dead, and medieval theology was being ignored or 
sneered at by the new intellectuals of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century. Montaigne, the 
great sceptical essayist, was the most popular writer of the day. The classic arguments for the existence of 
God were no longer popularly believed. What could the Christian apologist say to the sceptical mind of this 
age? Suppose such a typical mind lacked both the gift of faith and the confidence in reason to prove God's od's 
existence; could there be a third ladder out of the pit of unbelief into the light of belief? Pascal's Wager 
claims to be that third ladder. Pascal well knew that it was a low ladder. If you believe in God only as a bet, 
that is certainly not a deep, mature, or adequate faith. But it is something, it is a start, it is enough to dam the 
tide of atheism. The Wager appeals not to a high ideal, like faith, hope, love, or proof, but to a low one: the 
instinct for self-preservation, the desire to be happy and not unhappy. But on that low natural level, it has 
tremendous force. " (Kreeft, P.*, "Argument from Pascal's Wager," in Kreeft, P., "Fundamentals of the Faith: 
Essays in Christian Apologetics," Ignatius Press: San Francisco CA, 1988)

23/01/2010
"Thus Pascal prefaces his argument with the words, `Let us now speak according to our natural lights.' 
Imagine you are playing a game for two prizes. You wager blue chips to win blue prizes and red chips to win 
red prizes. The blue chips are your mind, your reason, and the blue prize is the truth about God's existence. 
The red chips are your will, your desires, and the red prize is heavenly happiness. Everyone wants both 
prizes, truth and happiness. Now suppose there is no way of calculating how to play the blue chips. 
Suppose your reason cannot win you the truth. In that case, you can still calculate how to play the red 
chips. Believe in God not because your reason can prove with certainty that it is true that God exists but 
because your will seeks happiness, and God is your only chance of attaining happiness eternally. Pascal 
says, `Either God is, or he is not. But to which view shall we be inclined? Reason cannot decide this 
question. [Remember that Pascal's Wager is an argument for sceptics.] Infinite chaos separates us. At the far 
end of this infinite distance [death] a coin is being spun that will come down heads [God] or tails [no God]. 
How will you wager?' " (Kreeft, P.*, "Argument from Pascal's Wager," in Kreeft, P., "Fundamentals of the 
Faith: Essays in Christian Apologetics," Ignatius Press: San Francisco CA, 1988)

23/01/2010
"The most powerful part of Pascal's argument comes next. It is not his refutation of atheism as a foolish 
wager (that comes last) but his refutation of agnosticism as impossible. Agnosticism, not-knowing, 
maintaining a sceptical, uncommitted attitude, seems to be the most reasonable option. The agnostic says, 
`The right thing is not to wager at all.' Pascal replies, `But you must wager. There is no choice. You are 
already committed [embarked].' We are not outside observers of life, but participants. We are like ships that 
need to get home, sailing past a port that has signs on it proclaiming that it is our true home and our true 
happiness. The ships are our own lives and the signs on the port say `God'. The agnostic says he will 
neither put in at that port (believe) nor turn away from it (disbelieve) but stay anchored a reasonable 
distance away until the weather clears and he can see better whether this is the true port or a fake (for there 
are a lot of fakes around). Why is this attitude unreasonable, even impossible? Because we are moving. The 
ship of life is moving along the waters of time, and there comes a point of no return, when our fuel runs out, 
when it is too late. The Wager works because of the fact of death. Suppose Romeo proposes to Juliet and 
Juliet says, `Give me some time to make up my mind.' Suppose Romeo keeps coming back day after day, and 
Juliet keeps saying the same thing day after day: `Perhaps tomorrow.' In the words of a small, female, red-
haired American philosopher [Little Orphan Annie], `Tomorrow is always a day away. And there comes a 
time when there are no more tomorrows.'  Then `maybe' becomes `no'. Romeo will die. Corpses do not marry. 
Christianity is God's marriage proposal to the soul. Saying `maybe' and `perhaps tomorrow' cannot continue 
indefinitely because life does not continue indefinitely. The weather will never clear enough for the agnostic 
navigator to be sure whether the port is true home or false just by looking at it through binoculars from a 
distance. He has to take a chance, on this port or some other, or he will never get home." (Kreeft, P.*, 
"Argument from Pascal's Wager," in Kreeft, P., "Fundamentals of the Faith: Essays in Christian 
Apologetics," Ignatius Press: San Francisco CA, 1988)

23/01/2010
"Once it is decided that we must wager; once it is decided that there are only two options, theism and 
atheism, not three, theism, atheism, and agnosticism; then the rest of the argument is simple. Atheism is a 
terrible bet. It gives you no chance of winning the red prize. Pascal states the argument this way: You have 
two things to lose: the true and the good; and two things to stake: your reason and your will, your 
knowledge and your happiness; and your nature has two things to avoid: error and wretchedness. Since 
you must necessarily choose, your reason is no more affronted by choosing one rather than the other. That 
is one point cleared up. But your happiness? Let us weigh up the gain and the loss involved in calling heads 
that God exists. Let us assess the two cases: if you win, you win everything: if you lose, you lose nothing. 
Do not hesitate then: wager that he does exist. If God does not exist, it does not matter how you wager, for 
there is nothing to win after death and nothing to lose after death. But if God does exist, your only chance of 
winning eternal happiness is to believe, and your only chance of losing it is to refuse to believe. As Pascal 
says, `I should be much more afraid of being mistaken and then finding out that Christianity is true than of 
being mistaken in believing it to be true.' If you believe too much, you neither win nor lose eternal 
happiness. But if you believe too little, you risk losing everything." (Kreeft, P.*, "Argument from Pascal's 
Wager," in Kreeft, P., "Fundamentals of the Faith: Essays in Christian Apologetics," Ignatius Press: San 
Francisco CA, 1988)

23/01/2010
"But is it worth the price? What must be given up to wager that God exists? Whatever it is, it is only finite, 
and it is most reasonable to wager something finite on the chance of winning an infinite prize. Perhaps you 
must give up autonomy or illicit pleasures, but you will gain infinite happiness in eternity, and `I tell you that 
you will gain even in this life `- purpose, peace, hope, joy, the things that put smiles on the lips of martyrs. 
Lest we take this argument with less seriousness than Pascal meant it, he concludes: `If my words please 
you and seem cogent, you must know that they come from a man who went down upon his knees before 
and after.'" (Kreeft, P.*, "Argument from Pascal's Wager," in Kreeft, P., "Fundamentals of the Faith: Essays in 
Christian Apologetics," Ignatius Press: San Francisco CA, 1988)

23/01/2010
"To the high-minded objector who refuses to believe for the low motive of saving the eternal skin of his own 
soul, we may reply that the Wager works quite as well if we change the motive. Let us say we want to give 
God his due if there is a God. Now if there is a God, justice demands total faith, hope, love, obedience, and 
worship. If there is a God and we refuse to give him these things, we sin maximally against the truth. But the 
only chance of doing infinite justice is if God exists and we believe, while the only chance of doing infinite 
injustice is if God exists and we do not believe. If God does not exist, there is no one there to do infinite 
justice or infinite injustice to. So the motive of doing justice moves the Wager just as well as the motive of 
seeking happiness. Pascal used the more selfish motive because we all have that all the time, while only 
some are motivated by justice, and only some of the time." (Kreeft, P.*, "Argument from Pascal's Wager," in 
Kreeft P., "Fundamentals of the Faith: Essays in Christian Apologetics," Ignatius Press: San Francisco CA, 
1988)

23/01/2010
"Because the whole argument moves on the practical rather than the theoretical level, it is fitting that Pascal 
next imagines the listener offering the practical objection that he just cannot bring himself to believe. Pascal 
then answers the objection with stunningly practical psychology, with the suggestion that the prospective 
convert `act into' his belief if he cannot yet `act out' of it. If you are unable to believe, it is because of your 
passions since reason impels you to believe and yet you cannot do so. Concentrate then not on convincing 
yourself by multiplying proofs of God's existence but by diminishing your passions. You want to find faith, 
and you do not know the road. You want to be cured of unbelief, and you ask for the remedy: learn from 
those who were once bound like you and who now wager all they have... . They behaved just as if they did 
believe. This is the same advice Dostoevsky's guru, Father Zossima, gives to the `woman of little faith' in 
The Brothers Karamazov. The behavior Pascal mentions is `taking holy water, having Masses said, and 
so on'. The behavior Father Zossima counsels to the same end is `active and indefatigable love of your 
neighbor.' In both cases, living the Faith can be a way of getting the Faith." (Kreeft, P.*, "Argument from 
Pascal's Wager," in Kreeft, P., "Fundamentals of the Faith: Essays in Christian Apologetics," Ignatius Press: 
San Francisco CA, 1988)

23/01/2010
"As Pascal says: `That will make you believe quite naturally and will make you more docile.' `But that is what 
I am afraid of.' `But why? What have you to lose?' An atheist visited the great rabbi and philosopher Martin 
Buber and demanded that Buber prove the existence of God to him. Buber refused, and the atheist got up to 
leave in anger. As he left, Buber called after him, `But can you be sure there is no God?' That atheist wrote, 
forty years later, `I am still an atheist. But Buber's question has haunted me every day of my life.' The Wager 
has just that haunting power." (Kreeft, P.*, "Argument from Pascal's Wager," in Kreeft, P., "Fundamentals of 
the Faith: Essays in Christian Apologetics," Ignatius Press: San Francisco CA, 1988)

24/01/2010
"Pascal's Wager argument can hardly be said to have set the world on fire. From its inception to the present 
day, when philosophers and theologians deign to mention it at all, they tend to do so by way of scornful 
dismissal. It is no exaggeration to say, with one nineteenth-century student of Pascal, that the argument 
`has been a scandal even to some of his greatest admirers. Theologians have treated it with lofty disdain, 
and `philosophers feel it somehow as a professional obligation not to accept its cogency. And yet, as this 
brief book will try to show, the charges of moral insensitivity and other such high-minded complaints often 
launched against the argument are based on a total misunderstanding of its aim and import, and reflect a 
callous refusal to accept the argument on its own terms. Only by failing to recognize the job that Pascal's 
argument is designed to accomplish-by seeing it as attempting a task altogether different from its actual 
probative aim-can one support the facile recriminations all too often thrown its way. And this is hardly 
reasonable: surely any argument can be made to look silly if reconstrued to aim at conclusions never even 
remotely intended for it." (Rescher, N.*, "Pascal's Wager: A Study of Practical Reasoning in Philosophical 
Theology," University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame IA, 1985, pp.2-3)

24/01/2010
"There is a strong streak of skepticism in Pascal-but not of irrationalism. Pascal is not concerned to 
downgrade reason per se-nor even to deny it a role in theology. Nor did he espouse the heresy of Fideism 
and maintain that proofs for the existence of God have no place whatsoever in the theological scheme of 
things. But one can only reason effectively from conceded premises, and in this apologetic context we can 
expect no substantial concessions. Theological reasoning is thus inadequate to the needs of apologetics-it 
cannot reach those who move on a purely mundane level. From the apologetic point of view those preuves 
de Dieu metaphysiques, Pascal tells us in sect. 381/543 of the Pensées, are simply useless: they are too 
complicated and too remote from the way people ordinarily reason. Pascal does not disdain or dislike 
theoretical reason. He is not a misologist. (How could so fine a mathematician and scientist be?!) He 
simply thinks that there are important tasks that theoretical reason cannot accomplish satisfactorily-that of 
demonstrating the fundamentals of the Christian religion to skeptical nonbelievers among them. He does not 
want us to abandon theoretical reason but simply to recognize that it has limits. Reason itself requires this 
recognition of us: `The highest achievement of reason is to recognize that there is an infinity of things 
beyond its grasp' (Pensées, 373/267)." (Rescher, N.*, "Pascal's Wager: A Study of Practical Reasoning in 
Philosophical Theology," University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame IA, 1985, p.10)

24/01/2010
"Agreement on the exact size of values is wholly unnecessary to the argument. All that matters is the rough 
and ready consideration that the magnitude of the value of the heavenly alternative is `incomparably greater' 
than that of the mundane - something effectively infinite by comparison." (Rescher, N.*, "Pascal's Wager: A 
Study of Practical Reasoning in Philosophical Theology," University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame IA, 
1985, p.18) 

24/01/2010
"Limitations of the Wager Argument It emerges from this account of the matter that the Wager argument 
is subject to certain limitations (of which Pascal himself was doubtless well aware). 1. It will certainly fail to 
touch the convinced atheist. Someone who sets the probability of God's existence at zero will obviously not 
arrive at the argument's conclusion." (Rescher, N.*, "Pascal's Wager: A Study of Practical Reasoning in 
Philosophical Theology," University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame IA, 1985, p.24. Emphasis original)

24/01/2010
"2. Nor does the argument reach the all-out hedonist who lives for the pleasure of the moment alone. 
Someone who lets the future look after itself or who is prepared to dismiss future benefits entirely-who 
(extending the lines of Daniel Bernoulli's resolution of the St. Petersburg paradox) is prepared to set the 
goods and evils of the next world at nought-would also remain untouched by the argument." (Rescher, N.*, 
"Pascal's Wager: A Study of Practical Reasoning in Philosophical Theology," University of Notre Dame 
Press: Notre Dame IA, 1985, p.24)

24/01/2010
"3. The argument will also have no impact on the all-trusting disbeliever. It is bound to leave untouched the 
person who, while believing that God does not exist, thinks that he is bound to be all-forgiving if (contra 
factum) he nevertheless did-and is therefore convinced that God, did he exist, would respond to disbelief 
and disobedience no differently from their opposites and would thus recompense disbelief no less amply 
than belief. Belief cannot be recommended on the basis of interest to someone who concedes it no 
possibility of advantage." (Rescher, N.*, "Pascal's Wager: A Study of Practical Reasoning in Philosophical 
Theology," University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame IA, 1985, p.24)

24/01/2010
"4. The argument does not deal with the radical skepticism of Pyrrhonian philosophy: the theorist who 
denies not only knowledge (episteme) but reasonable conviction (to pithanon) as well. For, like any 
other argument, it proceeds from premises and is accordingly impotent to enjoin its conclusion on someone 
who does not accept them. Unless we have some views about the nature of God (for example, believe that, 
should he exist, he will preferentially reward those who believe in him), Pascal's reasonings will leave us 
untouched. It is a grave mistake to think of the argument as addressed to the all-out philosophical skeptic. 
Pascal's skepticism clearly has its limits in this context. Precisely because he thinks that cognitive, 
theoretical reason cannot yield knowledge that is useful for apologetic purposes, he is prepared to fall back 
on practical, interest-oriented reason. Pascal's skepticism is of the sort envisioned in the Middle Academy: 
the fact that theoretical knowledge is unavailable being offset by the availability of reasonable 
conviction of just the sort by which we manage the affairs of everyday life." (Rescher, N.*, "Pascal's Wager: 
A Study of Practical Reasoning in Philosophical Theology," University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame 
IA, 1985, pp.24-25. Emphasis original)

24/01/2010
"5. Again, the argument carries no weight with someone who disdains the whole process of expected-value 
calculation and rejects the idea of letting the probability of profit afford `a guide to life.' The argument will 
only reach the prudently self-interested man who is prepared to proceed `calculatingly' in matters of self-
interest in line with standard decision-theoretic principles." (Rescher, N.*, "Pascal's Wager: A Study of 
Practical Reasoning in Philosophical Theology," University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame IA, 1985, p.25)

24/01/2010
"6. Finally, the argument is addressed not to those who incline to rival theologies (Zoroastrian, Buddhist, 
etc.) that have very different ideas about the rewards of belief, but to the ordinary indifferent, noncaring 
Christian-in-name-only (if that). It is only in a position to reach someone who conceives of God in a 
particular way, and it is not addressed to those who have nonstandard ideas about the nature of God." 
(Rescher, N.*, "Pascal's Wager: A Study of Practical Reasoning in Philosophical Theology," University of 
Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame IA, 1985, p.25)

24/01/2010
"The Wager argument, like any other, rests on particular premises-in its case, certain suppositions about the 
nature of God and his possibility. And it lies in the very nature of things that no argument, however cogent, 
can exert rational constraint on those who do not accept its premises. This is simply a fact of life and nowise 
a defect or limitation of the Wager argument." (Rescher, N.*, "Pascal's Wager: A Study of Practical 
Reasoning in Philosophical Theology," University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame IA, 1985, p.25)

24/01/2010
"Since the days of Lucretius the following sort of reasoning has been advanced by antitheists: `Disbelief is 
actually beneficial. For rejection of god, and supernatural beings in general, squarely puts the responsibility' 
for our human concerns on us humans, forcing us to come to grips with our problems. We have here an 
interesting inversion of Pascal's line of thought-a theological argument from interest, to be sure, but on the 
side of disbelief rather than belief. In principle this sort of table-turning is fair enough. But this particular 
argument turns out to be specious-against Christianity at any rate. For the Christian God neither meddles in 
human affairs in the manner of the Greek gods on Mount Olympus nor manages them altogether in the 
manner of the fate decreed by an oriental-style God-potentate. He neither creates our problems nor relieves 
us of the task of grappling with them. Of course, where the God at issue is conceived of in a way 
substantially different from that of standard Christianity, the Wager argument can make no impact." 
(Rescher, N.*, "Pascal's Wager: A Study of Practical Reasoning in Philosophical Theology," University of 
Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame IA, 1985, pp.25-26)

25/01/2010
"The Final State. The final judgment serves the purpose of setting forth clearly what the final state of 
each person will be. a. The final state of the wicked. The wicked are consigned to the place of punishment 
called `hell'. Some deny that hell is a place and regard it merely as a condition, but the Bible uses local terms 
right along. It speaks, for instance, of a `furnace of fire', Matt. 13:42, a `lake of fire', Rev. 20:14, 15, and of a 
`prison', I Pet. 3:19, all of which are local terms. In this place they will be totally deprived of the divine favour, 
will experience an endless disturbance of life, will suffer positive pains in body and soul, and will be subject 
to pangs of conscience, anguish, and despair, Matt. 8:12, 13; Mark 9:47, 48; Luke 16:23, 28; Rev. 14:10; 21:8. 
There will be degrees in their punishment, Matt. 11:22, 24; Luke 12:47, 48; 20:47. It is evident that their 
punishment will be eternal. Some deny this, because the words `eternal' and `everlasting' may simply denote 
a long period of time. Yet this is not the usual meaning of the words, and there is no reason to think that 
they have that meaning when applied to the future punishment of the wicked. Moreover, other terms are 
used, which point to endless punishment, Mark 9:43, 48; Luke 16:26." (Berkhof, L.*, "A Summary of 
Christian Doctrine," [1938], Banner of Truth Trust: London, British edition, 1960, Third impression, 1968, 
p.181. Emphasis original)

25/01/2010
"b. The final state of the righteous. The final state of believers will be preceded by the passing of the 
present world and the establishment of a new creation. This will not be an entirely new creation, but rather a 
renewal of the present creation, Ps. 102:26, 27; Heb. 12:26-28. Heaven will be the eternal abode of believers. 
Some think of heaven merely as a condition, but the Bible clearly represents it as a place, John 14:2; Matt. 
22:12, 13; 25:10-12. The righteous will not only inherit heaven, but the entire new creation, Matt. 5:5; Rev. 
21:1-3. The reward of the righteous is described as eternal life, that is, not merely endless life, but life in all its 
fulness, without any of the imperfections and disturbances of the present. This fulness of life is enjoyed in 
communion with God, which is really the essence of eternal life, Rev. 21:3. While all will enjoy perfect bliss, 
there will be degrees also in the enjoyments of heaven, Dan. 12:3; II Cor. 9:6." (Berkhof, L.*, "A Summary of 
Christian Doctrine," [1938], Banner of Truth Trust: London, British edition, 1960, Third impression, 1968, 
pp.181-182. Emphasis original)

25/01/2010
"OF THE LAST JUDGMENT. SECTION I.-God hath appointed a day wherein he will judge the world in 
righteousness by Jesus Christ, [Acts xvii. 31] to whom all power and judgment is given of tho Father, [John v. 
22, 27] In which day, not only the apostate angels shall be judged, [1 Cor. vi. 3; Jude 6; 2 Pet. ii. 4] but 
likewise all persons that have lived upon earth shall appear before the tribunal of Christ, to give an 
account of their thoughts, words, and deeds, and to receive according to what they have done in the body, 
whether good or evil. [2 Cor. v. 10; Eccles. xii. 14; Rom. ii. 16; xiv. 10, 12; Matt. xii. 36, 37]" (Hodge, A.A.*, 
"The Confession of Faith: A Handbook of Christian Doctrine Expounding The Westminster Confession," 
[1869], Banner of Truth: Edinburgh, 1958, Reprinted, 1983, p.389. Emphasis original)

25/01/2010
"SECTION II.-The end of God's appointing this day is for the manifestation of the glory of his mercy in the 
eternal salvation of the elect, and of his justice in the damnation of the reprobate, who are wicked and 
disobedient. For then shall the righteous go into everlasting life, and receive that fulness of joy and 
refreshing which shall come from the presence of the Lord; but the wicked, who know not God, and obey 
not the gospel of ,Jesus Christ, shall be cast into eternal torments, and be punished with everlasting 
destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power. [Matt. xxv. 31-40; Rom. ii. 5, 6; ix. 
22, 23. Matt. xxv. 21; Acts iii. 19; 2 Thess. i. 7-10.]" (Hodge, A.A.*, "The Confession of Faith: A Handbook of 
Christian Doctrine Expounding The Westminster Confession," [1869], Banner of Truth: Edinburgh, 1958, 
Reprinted, 1983, 1983, p.389. Emphasis original)

26/01/2010
"Since the days of Lucretius the following sort of reasoning has been advanced by antitheists: `Disbelief is 
actually beneficial. For rejection of god, and supernatural beings in general, squarely puts the responsibility for 
our human concerns on us humans, forcing us to come to grips with our problems.' We have here an interesting 
inversion of Pascal's line of thought-a theological argument from interest, to be sure, but on the side of disbelief 
rather than belief. In principle this sort of table-turning is fair enough. But this particular argument turns out to be 
specious-against Christianity at any rate. For the Christian God neither meddles in human affairs in the manner of 
the Greek gods on Mount Olympus nor manages them altogether in the manner of the fate decreed by an oriental-
style God-potentate. He neither creates our problems nor relieves us of the task of grappling with them. Of 
course, where the God at issue is conceived of in a way substantially different from that of standard Christianity, 
the Wager argument can make no impact." (Rescher, N.*, "Pascal's Wager: A Study of Practical Reasoning in 
Philosophical Theology," University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame IA, 1985, pp.25-26)

26/01/2010
"But what of the person who sets all those supposedly splendid benefits of salvation at zero? What if my value 
structure accounts the prospect of error in religious matters as catastrophic and sets the attainment of heavenly 
bliss at naught? Or what if the very possibility of false belief is repulsive to me ... Then well and good-so be it. 
The Wager argument will leave me unmoved. If one is that sort of person (but then how many of us are?), this 
whole line of reasoning will pass us by. Still it nowise, of course, injures the argument as such. As we have seen, 
the argument can only be expected to touch those who endorse its basic commitments-who accept its premises, 
as it were." (Rescher, N.*, "Pascal's Wager: A Study of Practical Reasoning in Philosophical Theology," 
University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame IA, 1985, p.26)

26/01/2010
"Here it is necessary to bear the apologetic purposes of the Wager argument in mind. Pascal's discussion is 
directed at l'homme moyen sensuel [the sensual average man], the ordinary, self-centered `man of the world' 
preoccupied with his own well-being and his own prudential interests. Pascal does not address the already 
converted, but the glib worldly cynic-the freethinking libertin of his day, the sort of persons who populated 
the social circle in which Pascal himself moved prior to his conversion. The format of the discussion is that of a 
dialogue with just such a person. And it is part of the tacit ground rules of the discussion that there is to be no 
appeal to faith, to religious experiences, to authority-to any evidence that goes beyond man's `natural light.' 
Pascal's concern is thus with the rational justification of an action through an appeal to self-interest." (Rescher, 
N.*, "Pascal's Wager: A Study of Practical Reasoning in Philosophical Theology," University of Notre Dame 
Press: Notre Dame IA, 1985, pp.26-27)

26/01/2010
"The aim of Pascal's Wager argument is one of apologetics and not of theological theorizing. And, even here, it is 
a special-purpose instrument with a limited and special mission-to stiffen the backbone of the slack and worldly 
Christian. The convinced atheist, the radical philosophical skeptic, the all-out hedonist, the all-trusting 
disbeliever, and those otherwise predisposed toward alien theological systems will not (and are not intended to) 
be reached by this mode of argumentation. These other battles of apologetics must be fought on other fronts 
with other weapons." (Rescher, N.*, "Pascal's Wager: A Study of Practical Reasoning in Philosophical Theology," 
University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame IA, 1985, p.27)

26/01/2010
"In view of its status as an appeal to self-interest, many commentators have felt that Pascal's Wager argument is 
altogether beneath the dignity of serious religiosity and unworthy of a religious thinker deserving of this name. 
But this line of objection loses sight of the job that Pascal actually intends the argument to do. His deliberations 
are intended to motivate l'homme moyen sensuel [the sensual average man] into making a start at religious 
faith, and his pivotal question is this: What line of thought could prove effective in bringing the nominally 
Christian but actually slack, indifferent, and worldly outsider into the fold of believers? If we fail to reckon with 
the apologetic purpose of the argument as delineated in these terms, we will not be in a position to evaluate it 
appropriately." (Rescher, N.*, "Pascal's Wager: A Study of Practical Reasoning in Philosophical Theology," 
University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame IA, 1985, p.27)

26/01/2010
"The Wager Argument as a First Step No doubt God must be expected to have a value framework akin to the 
human in this regard; at any rate, he, like us, would prefer to be loved for himself alone rather than for strictly 
prudential motives. Still, the journey toward disinterested love must make a start someplace. A human lover 
would certainly rather have that love reciprocated for his wealth or beaux yeux than not reciprocated at all. 
Wisely he recognizes that the love which begins in crass considerations of personal advantage, social 
conformity, or parental pressure may in time be purified by habit and the natural evolution of shared concerns 
into genuine communion and true affection. Here too the element of hope is present-the hope that an attachment 
born in an ambience of `unworthy' motives may ultimately change into something better and finer. Seeing that 
people are generally acute enough to sense this circumstance, there is no reason to think God to be unmindful of 
it." (Rescher, N.*, "Pascal's Wager: A Study of Practical Reasoning in Philosophical Theology," University of 
Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame IA, 1985, p.121. Emphasis original)

26/01/2010
"By itself the prudential approach certainly falls far short of that full-bloodedly Christian position which calls for 
belief to rest not on self-interest but on a commitment to ideals-not on a calculation of advantage, but on genuine 
faith. The Wager argument is thus no more than a starting point. Its potential contribution is at most that which 
Pascal envisaged for it as a mere beginning for the process of Heart's enlightenment of Mind. The prudential 
orientation of the argument is only a point of departure on the journey toward a purer belief that moves from a 
hope for personal advantage toward a hope for the disinterested good. A faith based on prudential self-interest 
is not-cannot be-the end of the line. But Pascal sees it as a virtually inevitable place to begin for many or most 
men. To his mind what is unworthy is not his argumentation but rather its addressees. Man is unworthy. But it is, 
of course, man with whom we have to deal." (Rescher, N.*, "Pascal's Wager: A Study of Practical Reasoning in 
Philosophical Theology," University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame IA, 1985, pp.121-122)

26/01/2010
"The aim of Pascal's Wager is to induce people to try the religious life. It appeals to prudence because in 
apologetics prudence is the best available instrument we have before taking the plunge, as it were. Later on, x 
post facto one can doubtless do more-and better. ... The Wager argument is ... an opening gun, an initiating 
move, the first step on a long and complex journey. He assures us that if we take that difficult first step and make 
the effort, all will come out well. But he realized-and realized that God realizes-that one must not be too fastidious 
in one's dealings with imperfect men. An appeal to prudence is not shameful but merely realistic." (Rescher, N.*, 
"Pascal's Wager: A Study of Practical Reasoning in Philosophical Theology," University of Notre Dame Press: 
Notre Dame IA, 1985, p.122)

26/01/2010
"It is (or should d be) clear that there are various degrees of development in the religious life and very different 
heights to which it can attain. But the ascent must have a start. An appeal to interest of the Pascal's Wager type 
can at any rate set our feet on the right path. It can inaugurate that dynamic and developmental process through 
which the baser side of our nature can be won over by the nobler, which-initially-has little choice but to appeal to 
the former on its own terms." (Rescher, N.*, "Pascal's Wager: A Study of Practical Reasoning in Philosophical 
Theology," University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame IA, 1985, pp.122-123)

26/01/2010
"Pascal is perfectly content to have his argument pivot on self-interest because, in the light of his apologetic 
aims, he views this as initially necessary to reach the sort of person whom he wants to persuade. There are also, 
of course, nonprudential grounds for belief, faith, and hope-reasons that are not crassly self-interested. And their 
inherent superiority is not to be denied. But one must walk before one can run-and one must make brittle iron 
before one can make firm steel. The less noble incentives to religious faith (or to morality, for that matter), are by 
no means contemptible in themselves precisely because they can provide helpful stepping-stones toward better 
things. It is not sensible for us to condemn fastidiously the humble helps along the journey's way. An ideology 
of all-or-nothing is neither very sensible nor very attractive." (Rescher, N.*, "Pascal's Wager: A Study of Practical 
Reasoning in Philosophical Theology," University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame IA, 1985, p.123)

26/01/2010
"The Wager argument is not intended (by Pascal at any rate) to provide for more than a first small step in the 
right direction. To motivate people effectively we must begin by meeting them where they are. And of course 
they are enmeshed in their own mundane affairs, devoted to self-advantage and self-interest. It is `men of the 
world,' men of the stripe of the shady Chevalier de Mere, that typify the sort of person to whom Pascal addresses 
his book-and his Wager argument. The person whom Pascal has in view is exactly the one whose motivating 
inclinations are so trenchantly analyzed in the Maxims of La Rochefoucault-the person moved first and foremost 
by the prudential appreciation of self-interest. The Wager argument accordingly pivots on the appeal to personal 
advantage, to reach man's mind at that level of self-interested rationality which is its  natural habitat. The self-
serving cast of the argument is not a defect, but a condition of its adequacy for the job it is designed to achieve." 
(Rescher, N.*, "Pascal's Wager: A Study of Practical Reasoning in Philosophical Theology," University of Notre 
Dame Press: Notre Dame IA, 1985, pp.123-124)

26/01/2010
"Is a calculating approach to belief wholly un-Christian? We read in Luke's gospel of Jesus saying: `For which of 
you, intending to build a tower, sitteth not down first and counteth the cost, whether he have sufficient to finish 
it? ... Or what king, going to make war against another king, sitteth not down first and consulteth whether he will 
be able with ten thousand to meet him that cometh against him with twenty thousand? ... So likewise, whosoever 
he be of you that forsaketh not all that he hath, he cannot be my disciple. (Luke 14: 28-33)' Or again, in a more 
familiar passage from Matthew: `For whosoever will save his life shall lose it: and whosoever will lose his life for 
my sake shall find it. For what is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul? Or what 
shall a man give in exchange for his soul? (Matthew 16: 25-26)' It would seem that the founder of Christianity was 
himself prepared to invite people to bethink themselves of gains and losses and to compare the costs and 
benefits of discipleship with the costs and benefits of a worldly life. That being so, it is hardly fitting for Christian 
apologists to turn plus royaliste que le roi [more royalist than the king] in condemning Pascal's invocation of 
exactly this same comparison. The Wager argument can, without great violence, simply be read as a commentary 
on biblical passages of the preceding sort. What it does is to extend an invitation to contemplate the contrast 
between the real and the ideal orders and to consider the gulf between what we are and what we should try to 
be." (Rescher, N.*, "Pascal's Wager: A Study of Practical Reasoning in Philosophical Theology," University of 
Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame IA, 1985, p.124)

26/01/2010
"We will of course fail to bridge this gulf. In the religious life-as in the moral life and in the life of inquiry-we 
cannot attain perfection. Our task, however, is not to succeed to perfection, but to do our best-to make the effort. 
Authentic faith, comprehensive knowledge, genuine morality are all idealizations-aims that we cannot reach. 
They are idealizations that beckon us ever onward, and whose value lies not in the attainment but in the pursuit. 
The salient thing is not that we succeed to perfection, but that we keep trying-that we are not satisfied to sit 
contentedly where we are but feel impelled to persist, recognizing that even modest progress is worthwhile." 
(Rescher, N.*, "Pascal's Wager: A Study of Practical Reasoning in Philosophical Theology," University of Notre 
Dame Press: Notre Dame IA, 1985, pp.124-125)

26/01/2010
"The Wager argument is thus only a beginning. It does not lead to the destination of the religious journey, but 
merely helps to provide a start. The journey has to begin somewhere. And with crassly mundane people a crassly 
mundane starting point is indicated. All the same, the Wager argument pivots on hope-and on a vision, however 
limited, of the good. It represents an expression of faith in the role of values in the scheme of things. And while 
the value at issue in the Wager argument is as such one of a rather low level-namely self-interest-Pascal is 
convinced that the matter neither should nor can stop there." (Rescher, N.*, "Pascal's Wager: A Study of Practical 
Reasoning in Philosophical Theology," University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame IA, 1985, p.125)

26/01/2010
"Even if we set aside the issue of what the structure of the human psyche may or may not imply about the 
existence of God, the findings of modern psychological research introduce an important change in the terms 
of the age-old debate between believers and atheists. In particular, it leads to a reevaluation of Pascal's 
famous `wager.' Responding to the first generation of modern atheistic rationalists in the seventeenth 
century, the mathematician and philosopher Blaise Pascal offered an interesting `thought experiment' 
concerning religious belief. He conceived of the issue as a bet or wager. His reasoning was as follows: 
Revelation teaches that God rewards faithful believers with eternal happiness and that those who reject God 
suffer eternal torment after death. There is no way for reason, Pascal conceded to his contemporaries, to 
know whether revelation's claim is true. But we may consider our life as a wager (one that, in the nature of 
things, we can't avoid). If we bet against God, and revelation proves to be true, we will suffer eternal 
torment. If we bet for God, and revelation proves to have been an illusion, we lose nothing, for we shall 
cease to exist at death in any case." (Glynn, P.*, "God: The Evidence: The Reconciliation of Faith and 
Reason in a Postsecular World," Forum: Rocklin CA, 1997, pp.76-77)

26/01/2010
"Of course, the touchy issue here concerns what those who opt for belief must sacrifice in this life: 
Revelation teaches that they must, in Pascal's words, `curtail' their `passions.' Pascal tried to minimize this 
sacrifice by pointing to the purely rational benefits of a life lived in conformity with the moral law. `Now, 
what harm will you come by,' he wrote, `in making this choice? You will be faithful, honest, humble, grateful, 
generous, a sincere friend, truthful. Certainly, you will not enjoy those pernicious delights-glory and luxury; 
but will you not experience others?' The atheist and agnostic suspicion has always been that Pascal had 
soft-pedaled the sacrifice end of the bargain. In giving up the pleasures and glories that religion teaches us 
to forgo, so the atheist argument has run, we are indeed sacrificing much. ... But modern research in 
psychology makes clear that the morally unrestrained life is not worth living. The crowning irony is this: 
Even if their beliefs were to be proved illusions, religiously committed people lead happier and healthier 
lives, as numerous studies show." (Glynn, P.*, "God: The Evidence: The Reconciliation of Faith and Reason 
in a Postsecular World," Forum: Rocklin CA, 1997, p.77)

26/01/2010
"Symbiogeneticist Lynn Margulis, who was awarded the US Presidential Medal for Science in 1999, 
says `survival of the fittest' is a `capitalistic, competitive, cost-benefit interpretation of Darwin' and that 
natural selection is `neither the source of heritable novelty nor the entire evolutionary process'. 
Margulis has pronounced neo-Darwinism `dead', since there's no adequate evidence in the literature 
that random mutations result in new species." (Mazur, S., "An Interview with Lynn Margulis: Is Neo-
Darwinism Dead?," CounterPunch, April 2, 2009)

27/01/2010
"Pascal was profoundly aware of the real nature of religion. His God was not the God of rationalist argument 
who is a mere hypothesis, invoked to make other hypotheses feasible. God is not known by reason in this 
way. 'The heart has its reasons which are unknown to reason...it is the heart which is aware of God and not 
reason. That is what faith is: God perceived intuitively by the heart, not by reason.' [Turnell, M., transl., 
"Pascal's Pensees," Harvill Press, London, 1962, p.163] To bring some men to the point of faith, Pascal knew 
that it was necessary to remind them of the odds that are at stake. Hence his celebrated wager, [Ibid., pp. 
200 ff.] in which he challenges men to gamble their lives on the possibility that Christianity might be true. 
We cannot see God. We cannot prove the truth of the gospel to exclude every possible doubt. We can only 
find out the truth of Christianity by risking our whole lives on it." (Brown, C., "Philosophy and the Christian 
Faith," Tyndale Press: London, 1969, p.59)

27/01/2010
"In direct opposition to the rationalist; Pascal points out that, 'The metaphysical proofs of the existence of 
God are so remote from men's methods of reasoning and so involved that they produce little impact; and 
even if they did help some people, the effect would only last for a few moments while they were actually 
watching the demonstration, but an hour later they would be afraid that they had made a mistake. What they 
had gained by their curiosity would be lost through pride' [St. Augustine, Sermons, CXLI]. That is the 
result of a knowledge of God which is reached without Jesus Christ, ... Instead of which those who have 
known God through a mediator are aware of their own wretchedness.' [Turnell, M., transl., "Pascal's 
Pensees," Harvill Press, London, 1962, p.212]" (Brown, C., "Philosophy and the Christian Faith," Tyndale 
Press: London, 1969, p.59)

27/01/2010
"Sometimes Pascal's teaching is classified as voluntarism, the implication being that he sets greater store by 
the will than by the intellect. It is even represented as a kind of self-inflicted brain-washing, in which the will 
to believe is allowed to banish all intellectual considerations. But this is a caricature. It neglects to mention 
that the idea of the wager was addressed to the sporting men of the day, reminding them of a greater game 
played at infinitely greater odds. It does not take into account the fact that Pascal devoted a great deal of 
energy to rational argument. [Turnell, M., transl., "Pascal's Pensees," Harvill Press, London, 1962, pp.231ff, 
281ff., 291]" (Brown, C., "Philosophy and the Christian Faith," Tyndale Press: London, 1969, pp.59-60)

* Authors with an asterisk against their name are believed not to be evolutionists. However, lack of
an asterisk does not necessarily mean that an author is an evolutionist.

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Copyright © 2010, by Stephen E. Jones. All rights reserved. These my quotes may be used
for non-commercial purposes only and may not be used in a book, ebook, CD, DVD, or any other
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to this page would be appreciated.
Created: 10 January, 2010. Updated: 10 April, 2010.